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PARTIES TO APPEAL 
Appellants: Nagle Construction, Inc., GaryM. Nagle, MarilynF.Nagle(collectively 
"Nagle"). 
Appellee: Kathryn Collard as Trustee for the LeRoy Collard Trust, the successor-
in-interest to LeRoy Collard (collectively the "Trust"). 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2a-3 and 
Article 8, § I of the Utah Constitution. This is an appeal from a final judgment of the Third 
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, entered on August 15, 2005. 
Appellants filed a Notice of Appeal on August 18,2005. This case was ordered transferred 
to the Utah Court of Appeals on August 22,2005. This Court vacated the transfer order on 
September 29, 2005. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY GRANTING THE 
TRUST A DECREE FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE AFTER 
DETERMINING THAT THE TRUST HAD NOT FULLY PERFORMED 
UNDER THE REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE 
PARTIES. 
A. Specific Performance is an Equitable Remedy Which Requires That The 
Party Seeking It Must First Tender Full Performance of Its Own 
Contractual Obligations. 
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B. The Measure of Performance in This Case Was Whether The Shares of 
Stock Tendered by The Trust Pursuant to The Real Estate Purchase 
Contract Ever Reached a Value During The Time Period September 18, 
1979 Through September 18, 1980 Such That Nagle Could Realize 
$85,000. 
C. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion in Granting The Trust Specific 
Performance Because It Determined That The Shares Never Reached a 
Value Where Nagle Could Realize $85,000 and Because The Court 
Imposed Duties on Nagle Which Were Contrary to Nagle's Rights Under 
The Real Estate Purchase Contract. 
Standard of Review: In an equity action, the Appeals Court reviews the Trial 
Court's legal conclusions under a correction of error standard according those conclusions 
no particular deference. Englert v. Zane, 848 P.2d 165,168 (Utah App. 1993) (citing Bellon 
v. Malnar, 808 P.2d 1089, 1092 (Utah 1991)). The Appeals Court reviews the granting of 
a decree for specific performance for abuse of discretion. Morris v. Sykes. 624 P.2d 681, 
684 (Utah 1981). 
Preservation of Issue For Review: Entitlement to a decree of specific performance 
identified by Appeals Court as issue on remand. See Addendum, Ex. B at ff 26-27, 
R. 2427-28; raised by Nagle in his Memorandum in Support of his Motion in Limine, 
R. 1300; raised in Nagle's Pretrial Order, R. 2408; raised at trial, R. 2618 at 37-38, 41, 
R. 2619 at 371-75,385; rejected by Trial Court in Memorandum and Order of June 10,2005. 
See Addendum Ex. C at p. 24, R. 2502; Notice of Appeal, R. 2605-07. 
Brief.wpd -2-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Grounds For Review of Any Issues Not Preserved: The Trial Court committed 
plain error in ruling that the Trust was entitled to a decree of specific performance having 
also determined that the Trust did not fully perform its obligations under the Real Estate 
Purchase Contract. The error should have been obvious to the Trial Court and the error is 
harmful to Nagle. Therefore, Appellate Court review of this case is appropriate. State Ex. 
Rel. T.M.. 73 P.3d 959, 963 (Utah App. 2003). 
II. ASSUMING THAT NAGLE IS ENTITLED ONLY TO A MONETARY 
REMEDY, THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY 
CALCULATING AN OFFSET BASED UPON WHAT NAGLE COULD HAVE 
SOLD THE SHARES OF STOCK FOR BETWEEN SEPTEMBER 18, 1979 
AND SEPTEMBER 18, 1980 BECAUSE THE REAL ESTATE PURCHASE 
CONTRACT EXPRESSLY CONTEMPLATED THAT NAGLE WOULD NOT 
BE REQUIRED TO SELL THE SHARES UNTIL THEY REACHED A VALUE 
WHERE THEY COULD REALIZE $85,000 AND THAT NEVER HAPPENED. 
A. The Court Determined That an Offset Should be Calculated Based on 
What The Trust Owed Nagle ($85,000) Minus What Nagle Could Have 
Sold The Stock For During The Time Period in Question. 
B. The Terms of The Real Estate Purchase Contract Between The Parties, 
Specifically Addendum No. 2, Expressly State That Nagle Was Not 
Required to Sell Shares Until They Reached a Value During The Time 
Period September 18,1979 through September 18,1980 Whereby Nagle 
Could Realize $85,000. 
C. The Correct Offset Amount Should be at Least The Unpaid Purchase 
Price Plus Interest. 
Brief, wpd -3-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Standard of Review: In an equity action, the Appeals Court reviews the Trial 
Court's legal conclusions under a correction of error standard according those conclusions 
no particular deference. Englert v. Zane. 848 P.2d 165,168 (Utah App. 1993) (citing Behon 
v. Malnar, 808 P.2d 1089, 1092 (Utah 1991)). The Trial Court's fashioning of an equitable 
remedy is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States Fuel Co. v. H O C 79 P.3d 945, 
948 (Utah 2003). 
Preservation of Issue For Review: Raised at trial R. 2618 at45,R. 2619 at 371-74; 
rejected by Trial Court in Memorandum and Order of June 10,2005. See Addendum, Ex. C 
at p. 25, R. 2503; Notice of Appeal, R. 2605-07. 
Grounds For Review of Any Issues Not Preserved: The Trial Court committed 
plain error in ruling that the appropriate calculation of an offset should be measured by the 
amount due and owing Nagle minus what Nagle could have sold shares for during the time 
period at issue even though the contract between the parties did not require Nagle to sell the 
shares until they reached a value whereby Nagle could realize $85,000. The error should 
have been obvious to the Trial Court and the error is harmful to Nagle. Therefore, Appellate 
Court review of this issue is appropriate. State Ex. Rel. T.M.. 73 P.3d 959, 963 (Utah App. 
2003). 
< 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE TRUST HAD 
CONVEYED 105,000 SHARES OF STOCK TO NAGLE AS PART OF THE 
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT. 
A. The Trial Court's Ruling is Contrary to The Law of The Case. The 
Appeals Court Had Already Determined That The Trust Only Conveyed 
55,000 Shares As Part of The Transaction. 
B. The Trial Court's Ruling Barred is by The Statute of Frauds Because it 
is Predicated on a Finding That the Parties Orally Modified Their 
Contract to Sell Real Property. 
C. The Trial Court's Ruling is Against The Weight of The Evidence And is 
Clearly Erroneous. 
D. The Trust is Bound by Its Numerous Judicial Admissions That Only 
55,000 Shares Were Conveyed Under The Real Estate Purchase Contract. 
Standard of Review: In an equity action, the Trial Court's legal conclusions are 
reviewable under a correction of error standard according those conclusions no particular 
deference. Englert v. Zane, 848 P.2d 165, 168 (Utah App. 1993) (citing Bellon v. Malnar. 
808 P.2d 1089,1092 (Utah 1991)). The Trial Court's findings of fact in cases of equity are 
reviewed for clear error. Parduhn v. Bennett, 112 P.3d 495, 502 (Utah 2005). 
Preservation of Issue For Review: Raised in Nagle's Objection to the Trust's 
Rule 26(a)(4) Disclosures, R. 2104; raised in Nagle's Motion to Strike the Trust's Pretrial 
Order, R. 2378-79; raised by Nagle in his Pretrial Order, R. 2406 - 2408; objection raised at 
trial and overruled, R. 2618 at 981; R. 2619 at 375; rejected by Trial Court in Memorandum 
vV 
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and Order of June 10, 2005, Addendum, Ex. C at pp. 14-15, R. 2491-92; Notice of Appeal, 
R. 2605-07. 
Grounds For Review of Any Issues Not Preserved: The Trial Court committed 
plain error in ruling that the Trust conveyed 105,000 shares of stock to Nagle as part of the 
Real Estate Purchase Contract between the parties. The error should have been obvious to 
the Trial Court and the error is harmful to Nagle. Therefore, Appellate Court review of this 
issue is appropriate. State Ex. Rel. T.M.. 73 P.3d 959, 963 (Utah App. 2003). 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT THE TRUST 
BEHAVED EQUITABLY WHEN IT CONVEYED THE PROPERTY AT 
ISSUE TO AN INSIDER OF THE TRUST DURING THE PENDENCY OF 
THE FIRST APPEAL WHO PAID BELOW FAIR MARKET VALUE AND 
TOOK TITLE WITH FULL KNOWLEDGE THAT NAGLE HAD PLACED A 
LIS PENDENS ON THE PROPERTY. 
Standard of Review: In an equity action, the Appeals Court reviews the Trial 
Court's legal conclusions under a correction of error standard according those conclusions 
no particular deference. Englert v. Zane. 848 P.2d 165,168 (Utah App. 1993) (citing Bellon 
v. Malnar. 808 P.2d 1089,1092 (Utah 1991)). The Trial Court's findings of fact in cases of 
equity are reviewed for clear error. Parduhn v. Bennett. 112 P.3d 495,502 (Utah 2005). The 
Trial Court's application of equitable principles is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id. at 
506. 
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Preservation of Issue For Review: Raised at trial R. 2619 at 324-328; rejected by 
Trial Court in Memorandum and Order of June 10,2005, Addendum, Ex. C at p. 16, R. 2494; 
Notice of Appeal, R. 2605-07. 
Grounds For Review of Any Issues Not Preserved: The Trial Court committed 
plain error in ruling that the Trust behaved equitably when it conveyed title to the property 
to an insider of the Trust during the pendency of the first appeal when the insider paid below 
fair market value for the property and took title with knowledge of the lis pendens Nagle 
placed on the property. The error should have been obvious to the Trial Court and the error 
is harmful to Nagle. Therefore, Appellate Court review of this issue is appropriate. State Ex. 
Rel. T.M.. 73 P.3d 959, 963 (Utah App. 2003). 
V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT AWARDING NAGLE 
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST BECAUSE THE AMOUNT OWED ($85,000) 
WAS A FIXED AMOUNT DUE AND OWING AT THE TIME THE TRUST 
FAILED TO PERFORM ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE REAL ESTATE 
PURCHASE CONTRACT AND INTEREST CAN BE CALCULATED WITH 
MATHEMATICAL ACCURACY. 
A. The Trial Court Determined That The Trust Had Failed to Perform Its 
Obligations Under The Real Estate Purchase Contract in That The Stock 
Conveyed as Part of The Purchase Price Did Not Reach a Value at Any 
Time During September 18,1979 Through September 18,1980 Where Its 
Sale Could Realize $85,000. 
B. Following September 18, 1980, The Trust Was in Default of The 
Agreement And Was Subsequently Notified by Nagle of The Default. 
Brief.wpd -7-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
C. Upon Default, Nagle Was Owed a Fixed Amount of $85,000 Which is a 
Fixed Sum. The Default Was Never Cured. Interest Can be Calculated 
With Mathematical Accuracy. 
Standard of Review: A trial court's decision to grant or deny a prejudgment interest 
presents a question of law reviewed for correctness. Lvon v. Burton, 5 P.3d 616, 636 (Utah 
2000). 
Preservation of Issue For Review: Issue of prejudgment interest raised by Nagle 
in Pretrial Order, R. 2408; raised by Nagle at trial R. 2618 at 45; R. 2619 at 385; denied by 
Trial Court in Memorandum and Order Of June 10, 2005, Addendum, Ex. C at p. 30, R. 
2508; Notice of Appeal, R. 2605-07. 
Grounds for Review of Any Issue Not Preserved: The Trial Court committed plain 
error in ruling that Nagle was not entitled to prejudgment interest after ruling that the Trust 
had failed to perform its obligations and Nagle was owed $85,000 under the express terms 
of the Real Estate Purchase Contract. The error should have been obvious to the Trial Court 
and the error is harmful to Nagle. Therefore, Appellate Court review of this issue is 
appropriate. State Ex. Rel. T.M., 73 P.3d 959, 963 (Utah App. 2003). 
VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT AWARDING NAGLE ATTORNEY'S 
FEES AS PREVAILING PARTY. 
Standard of Review: Review of the Trial Court's determination as to who was the 
prevailing party is conducted under an abuse of discretion standard. R.T. Nielson Co. v. 
Cookl^O P.3d 1119, 1127 (Utah 2002). 
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Preservation of Issue for Review: Identified for issue on remand, Addendum, Ex. B 
at % 29, R. 2429. Raised at trial, R. 2618 at 45; 2619 at 385-86; rejected by Trial Court in 
Memorandum and Order of June 10, 2005, Addendum, Ex. C at p. 32, R. 2510; Notice of 
Appeal, R. 2605-07. 
Grounds For Review of Any Issues Not Preserved: The Trial Court committed 
plain error in not awarding attorneys fees to Nagle as prevailing party. The error should have 
been obvious to the Trial Court and the error is harmful to Nagle. Therefore, Appellate Court 
review of this issue is appropriate. State Ex. Rel. T.M., 73 P.3d 959,963 (Utah App. 2003). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of The Case 
This is an action to determine whether the Trust performed its obligations under a 
Real Estate Purchase Contract with Nagle so that the Trust would be entitled to a decree for 
specific performance to obtain title to a condominium unit that Nagle built and owned. 
Under the terms of the contract, the Trust was required to pay Nagle $10,000 down, assume 
a mortgage on the property and pay an additional $85,000. Nagle agreed to accept 55,000 
shares of stock in lieu of the $85,000 provided that during the time period of September 18, 
1979 through September 18, 1980 the shares reached a value where Nagle could realize 
$85,000 from their sale. If the shares did not reach that value, the Trust was to pay $85,000 
in cash or more shares before receiving title to the property. 
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The Trust paid the $ 10,000 down; it did not assume the mortgage although it did pay 
the mortgage amounts through payoff; the 55,000 shares never reached a value where they 
could realize $85,000 during the appointed time. The Trust never paid Nagle $85,000 nor 
tendered more shares. Because Nagle never received shares or cash valued at $85,000, he 
never conveyed title to the property to the Trust. 
Course of Proceedings 
The Trust filed a Complaint on July 28, 1999, alleging breach of contract, adverse 
possession and declaratory judgment to quiet title, among other claims. Nagle filed an 
Answer and Counterclaim. The parties ultimately filed cross-motions for summary 
judgment. On November 6, 2000, the Trial Court granted the Trust's request for quiet title 
relief and ordered Nagle to convey title to the Trust upon final payment of the mortgage. 
Nagle appealed this judgment but was unable to stay enforcement. Title was subsequently 
conveyed to the Trust. 
In a ruling dated September 26, 2002, as amended on November 12, 2002, the Utah 
Court of Appeals vacated the Trial Court's November 6, 2000 Order in its entirety and 
remanded the case back to the Trial Court to determine whether the Trust had actually 
performed under the contract. Specifically, the Appeals Court held: 
If, on remand, the fact finder determines that the 55,000 shares 
were worth at least $85,000 at some point in time between 
September 18, 1979 and September 18, 1980, and that [Nagle] 
was obligated to sell the shares at that time, then [the Trust] has 
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performed [its] obligations and [Nagle] is not entitled to further 
relief. However, if the fact finder determines that the shares did 
not reach a value of $85,000 within the appointed period, 
[Nagle] is entitled to offset the amount of the shortfall [the 
Trust] was obligated to pay in cash or additional shares against 
the value of the property. 
The Appeals Court subsequently amended its opinion to allow Nagle to seek title to the 
property as a remedy for the Trust's default. Addendum, Ex. B at ^  26, R. 2418, R. 2428. 
Disposition in The Lower Court 
The Trial Court conducted a bench trial on June 7 and 8,2005. The Trial Court issued 
a Memorandum and Order on June 10, 2005 granting the Trust a decree of specific 
performance, despite finding that the shares of stock never reached a value of $85,000 during 
the specified time period. The Trial Court also fashioned an offset remedy awarding Nagle 
$32,550 representing the difference between the $85,000 owed by the Trust and what the 
Trial Court concluded Nagle could have earned had he attempted to sell the shares during the 
time in question. 
The Trial Court entered a final judgment on August 15,2005. This appeal followed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On March 30, 1978, the Trust entered into an agreement with Nagle to 
purchase a condominium unit. Using a Uniform Real Estate Contract, the Trust agreed to 
pay $ 100,500 for the condominium by (1) making a down payment of $ 10,000; (2) assuming 
a mortgage loan owed by Nagle to First Security Bank in the amount of $59,958.75; and (3) 
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tendering 55,000 shares of the Utah Coal & Chemical Company for the balance of the 
purchase price. See Real Estate Purchase Contract, Addendum, Ex. A, R. 2414-17; see also 
Appeals Court Opinion, Addendum, Ex. B at If 2, R. 2420. In return, Nagle agreed to convey 
title to the condominium when the Trust verified that the value of the stock was sufficient 
to cover the unpaid balance of the purchase price. R. 2413; R. 2420. 
2. The Trust paid the $ 10,000 down and began making payments on the mortgage. 
However, the Trust never assumed the mortgage. R. 2421. Nagle informed the Trust that 
he considered the Trust's failure to assume the mortgage a breach of contract and advised the 
Trust that default and foreclosure proceedings could be instituted. In lieu of foreclosure 
proceedings, the Trust and Nagle added a Second Addendum to the contract on September 
18,1979. In Addendum No. 2, the Trust agreed to pay approximately $50,000 more for the 
condominium in exchange for Nagle's forebearance. Addendum 2 reads as follows: 
Title of premises being sold under the contract referred to above 
will be transferred when [Nagle] sells sufficient of the shares of 
Utah Coal & Chemical Corp. transferred under [the contract] to 
realize $85,000 cash. [Nagle] hereby agrees to sell shares 
sufficient to realize $85,000 within one year of receipt thereof 
providing the market value of said shares will cause a realization 
of $85,000. 
Should the value of the 55,000 shares conveyed not equal 
$85,000 within one year [the Trust] agrees to convey additional 
shares of Utah Coal & Chemical Corp. stock or cash sufficient 
to bring the total value conveyed to [Nagle] to $85,000 before 
[Nagle] conveys title to premises sold to [the Trust]. 
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R. 2421. The shares of stock did not reach a value such that Nagle could have realized 
$85,000 from their sale. Memorandum and Order of June 10, 2005, Addendum, Ex. C at 
p. 21, R. 2499. 
3. On January 13, 1981, Nagle, through his attorney, sent the Trust a letter 
informing the Trust that the shares of stock did not reach the required value of $85,000 
within one year and that the Trust had not yet paid the difference. Nagle went on to inform 
the Trust that he would consider the Trust in default if the Trust did not pay the amount still 
owed on the contract by January 25, 1981. The Trust did not make any further payments to 
Nagle. R. 2422; Trial Ex. 105, Addendum, Ex. D, R. 2430-31. 
4. The Real Estate Purchase Contract provides that in the event of default: 
[Nagle] shall have the right, upon failure of the [Trust] to 
remedy the default within five days after written notice, to be 
released from all obligations in law and in equity to convey said 
property, all payments which have been made theretofore on this 
contract by the [Trust], shall be forfeited to [Nagle] as liquidated 
damages for the non-performance of the contract, and the 
[Trust] agrees that [Nagle] may at his option re-enter and 
take possession of said premises without legal processes as in 
its first and former estate, together with all improvements 
and additions made by the [Trust] thereon, and the said 
additions and improvements shall remain with the land 
become [sic] the property of [Nagle], the [Trust] becoming 
at once a tenant at will of [Nagle]. 
Real Estate Purchase Contract at f 16, Addendum, Ex. A, R. 2415 (emphasis added). 
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5. On July 28, 1999, the Trust brought suit against Nagle, seeking a declaratory 
judgment to quiet title based on breach of contract and adverse possession. Nagle answered 
and counterclaimed for remedies under the contract, including forfeiture stnd foreclosure. 
Nagle also sought a declaratory judgment quieting title in him. Both parties filed motions 
for summary judgment. R. 2422. 
6. On November 6,2000, the Trial Court granted the Trust's motion for quiet title 
relief. The Court stayed that judgment pending Nagle posting bond. When Nagle was 
unable to post bond, the Trial Court vacated the stay and title to the property was conveyed 
to the Trust. R. 521-531; R. 621-626. 
7. On November 7, 2000, Nagle filed a Notice of Appeal, appealing the entirety 
of the Trial Court's judgment. R. 535. On November 21, 2000, Nagle placed a lis pendens 
on the property. Memorandum and Order of June 10, 2005, Addendum, Ex. C at p. 6, R. 
2484; Trial Ex. 18. 
8. On January 18, 2001, the Trust conveyed the property to K.N.B. Holdings, 
LLC ("KNB"). KNB is an affiliate of the Trust. Specifically, KNB's principal Kirk Blosch 
is married to a beneficiary of the Trust and is a brother-in-law of the trustee. KNB paid less 
than fair market value and took title to the property with full knowledge of the lis pendens. 
R. 2619 at p. 331,333-34. 
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9. On September 26,2002, the Utah Court of Appeals issued a ruling vacating the 
Trial Court's order and remanding the case for further proceedings. That opinion was 
amended on November 12,2002 to allow Nagle to recover title for the property. Addendum, 
Ex. B, R. 2418-30; R. 2619 at 321-27. 
10. The Trial Court conducted a bench trial on June 7 and 8, 2005. The Court 
issued a Memorandum Order on June 10, 2005. In that Order, the Trial Court granted the 
Trust a decree for specific performance and awarded Nagle an offset of $32,550. Final 
judgment was entered on August 15, 2005. Addendum, Ex. C, R. 2479-2511. 
11. Nagle timely filed a Notice of Appeal and obtained a stay of judgment. 
R. 2599-2602; R. 2605-07. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY GRANTING THE 
TRUST A DECREE FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE AFTER 
DETERMINING THAT THE SHARES OF STOCK DID NOT REACH A 
VALUE WHERE NAGLE COULD REALIZE $85,000 DURING THE TIME 
PERIOD SEPTEMBER 18,1979 THROUGH SEPTEMBER 18,1980. 
A. Specific Performance is an Equitable Remedy Which Requires That The 
Party Seeking It Must First Tender Full Performance of Its Contractual 
Obligations. 
The Trial Court granted the Trust a decree for specific performance. It is a long-
standing principle in Utah law that in order to obtain a decree for specific performance, the 
party seeking it must fully tender its own performance. The Trust did not tender full 
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performance because the Trial Court found that the shares of stock conveyed by the Trust 
never reached a value where Nagle could realize $85,000 during the time period of 
September 18, 1979 through September 18, 1980 as the Real Estate Purchase Contract 
required. 
B. The Measure of Performance in This Case Was Whether The Shares of 
Stock Tendered by The Trust Pursuant to The Real Estate Purchase 
Contract Ever Reached a Value During The Time Period September 18, 
1979 Through September 18, 1980 Such That Nagle Could Realize 
$85,000. 
In its Opinion vacating the Trial Court's November 6,2000 Order, the Utah Court of 
Appeals identified the measure of performance to be whether the 55,000 shares of Utah Coal 
& Chemical stock tendered by the Trust under the Real Estate Purchase Contract ever 
reached a value such that Nagle could realize the $85,000 remaining on the purchase price 
for the property. 
C. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion in Granting The Trust Specific 
Performance Because The Shares Never Reached a Value Where Nagle 
Could Realize $85,000 And Because The Court Imposed Duties on Nagle 
Which Were Contrary to Nagle's Rights Under The Real Estate Purchase 
Contract. 
The Trial Court determined that the shares conveyed by the Trust did not reach a value 
where Nagle could realize $85,000. Therefore, the Trust did not tender full performance of 
its obligations and is not entitled to a decree of specific performance under Utah law. Yet, 
the Trial Court nevertheless granted specific performance because, it concluded, Nagle could 
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have sold the shares to realize something close to $85,000 in the year period and therefor it 
would not be equitable to allow Nagle to recoup title. In reaching this conclusion, the Trial 
Court imposed contractual duties and burdens upon Nagle the parties did not bargain for, in 
violation of long-standing principles of equity and contract construction. The Trial Court 
abused its discretion in granting the Trust specific performance. 
II. ASSUMING THAT NAGLE IS ONLY ENTITLED TO A MONETARY 
REMEDY, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY CALCULATING AN OFFSET 
BASED UPON WHAT NAGLE COULD HAVE SOLD THE SHARES OF 
STOCK FOR BETWEEN SEPTEMBER 18,1979 AND SEPTEMBER 18,1980 
BECAUSE THE REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT EXPRESSLY 
CONTEMPLATED THAT NAGLE WOULD NOT BE REQUIRED TO SELL 
THE SHARES UNTIL THEY REACHED A VALUE WHERE THEY COULD 
REALIZE $85,000 AND THAT NEVER HAPPENED. 
A. The Court Determined That an Offset Should be Calculated Based Upon 
What The Trust Owed Nagle ($85,000) Minus What Nagle Could Have 
Sold The Stock For During The Time Period In Question. 
Assuming that Nagle is only entitled to a monetary remedy, the Trial Court abused its 
discretion in its calculation of the offset amount. The Trial Court decided that the offset 
should be based on the difference between what the Trust owed Nagle ($85,000) and what 
Nagle could have sold the shares he received to make up the difference. 
B. The Real Estate Purchase Contract, Specifically Addendum No. 2, 
Expressly States That Nagle Is Not Required to Sell Shares Until They 
Reach a Value During The Appointed Time Period Whereby Nagle Could 
Realize $85,000. 
The language of Addendum No. 2 expressly states: 
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[Nagle] hereby agrees to sell shares sufficient to realize $85,000 
within one year of receipt thereof providing the market value 
of said shares will cause a realization of $85,000. 
(emphasis added). 
This provision means Nagle had no obligation to sell the shares until they reached a 
value where they could realize $85,000. Therefore, Nagle did not have any contractual 
obligation to make up any difference on his own between what the Trust owed him ($85,000) 
and what it paid him ($0). For the Trial Court to fashion a remedy based on a failure to 
perform a condition that was not in the contract is an abuse of discretion. 
C. The Correct Offset Amount Should Be At Least The Unpaid Purchase 
Price Plus Interest. 
The Appeals Court made clear that any offset should consist of "the amount of the 
shortfall [the Trust] was obligated to pay." At the very least, then, Nagle is owed $85,000 
which is the difference between what he was owed and what the Trust paid. Nagle is also 
entitled to the interest that has accrued over the years because he timely notified the Trust of 
its default no later than January, 1981 and this default was never cured. 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE TRUST HAD 
CONVEYED 105,000 SHARES OF STOCK TO NAGLE AS PART OF THE 
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT. 
A. The Trial Court's Ruling Is Contrary To The Law of The Case. 
The Trial Court ruled in its November 6,2000 Order, which the Trust prepared, that 
the Trust had conveyed 55,000 shares of Utah Coal & Chemical stock to Nagle under 
Addendum No. 2 to the Real Estate Purchase Contract. The Appeals Court adopted this 
finding in its November, 2002 ruling. Under the mandate rule of the law of the case doctrine, 
the Trial Court did not have the authority to reconsider the issue of how many shares were 
conveyed, particularly when no new evidence was presented on the matter at the June, 2005 
trial. 
B. The Trial Court's Ruling is Barred By The Statute Of Frauds. 
The Trial Court essentially concluded the parties orally modified their agreement to 
call for more shares to be tendered as part of the purchase price. Yet, because the contract 
allegedly modified involved the sale of real property, the modification must be in writing. 
Otherwise, its unenforceable under the Utah Statute of Frauds. U.C.A. § 25-5-3. 
C. The Trial Court's Ruling Is Against The Weight Of The Evidence And Is 
Clearly Erroneous. 
The overwhelming weight of the evidence establishes that only 55,000 shares were 
conveyed to Nagle under the Real Estate Purchase Contract. This evidence includes the Real 
Estate Purchase Contract Addendum No. 2, contemporaneous correspondence of the parties 
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and judicial admissions from the Trust. The Trust did not provide any evidence supporting 
its position but merely re-argued the meaning of neutral documents. 
D. The Trust Is Bound by Its Judicial Admission That Only 55,000 Shares 
Were Conveyed Under The Real Estate Purchase Contract. 
The Trust has admitted throughout this case that it conveyed only 55,000 shares to 
Nagle as part of the transaction. It did not raise the issue of 105,000 shares until the eve of 
trial. It did not point to any new evidence which might otherwise warrant not holding the 
Trust to its admission. The Trust should not have been allowed to alter its stated and 
accepted position at trial. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT THE TRUST 
BEHAVED EQUITABLY WHEN IT CONVEYED THE PROPERTY AT 
ISSUE TO AN INSIDER OF THE TRUST DURING THE PENDENCY OF 
THE FIRST APPEAL WHO PAID BELOW FAIR MARKET VALUE FOR IT 
AND TOOK TITLE WITH A LIS PENDENS RECORDED AGAINST IT. 
Shortly after receiving title to the property and while the first appeal was pending 
before the Appeals Court, the Trust conveyed the property to a party in privity who paid 
below fair market value for it and took it with full knowledge of the lis pendens Nagle had 
recorded. The transfer was not an arms-length transaction but was designed to deny Nagle 
a remedy, namely recoupment of title to the property in the event he prevailed on appeal. 
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V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT AWARDING NAGLE PRE-
JUDGMENT INTEREST. 
Nagle was owed the fixed and determined sum of $85,000 at the time the Trust failed 
to perform after September 18, 1980. It was certainly owed that sum when he notified the 
Trust that it was in default in January, 1981. Prejudgment interest is a sum which can be 
calculated with mathematical accuracy in this case. Accordingly, Nagle is entitled to 
prejudgment interest from the time of the default to the present. 
VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT AWARDING NAGLE ATTORNEY'S 
FEES AS PREVAILING PARTY. 
The Real Estate Purchase Contract provides for attorney's fees to the prevailing party. 
Because the Trial Court determined that the Trust had not performed and that Nagle was 
entitled to a remedy, it follows necessarily that Nagle is the prevailing party for purposes of 
the Real Estate Purchase Contract and should be awarded attorney's fees. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY GRANTING THE 
TRUST A DECREE FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE AFTER 
DETERMINING THE SHARES OF STOCK DID NOT REACH A VALUE 
WHERE NAGLE COULD REALIZE $85,000. 
A. Specific Performance is an Equitable Remedy Which Requires That The 
Party Seeking It Must First Tender Full Performance Of Its Own 
Contractual Obligations. 
The criteria for awarding specific performance is well known. "To obtain a decree 
for specific performance against a defaulting party, the aggrieved party must make an 
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unconditional tender of the performance required by the agreement." Kelley v. 
Leucadia Fin. Corp., 846 P.2d 1238, 1243 (Utah 1992) (emphasis added). Failure to make 
the tender called for under the agreement is a sufficient basis to deny specific performance. 
LHIW. Inc. v. DeLorean, 753 P.2d 961, 963 (Utah 1988); see also Lincoln Land & 
Development Co. v. Thompson. 489 P.2d 426, 428 (Utah 1971). The Trial Court's award 
of specific performance is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Morris v. Sykes, 
624 P.2d 681, 684 (Utah 1981). However, even in an equity action, the Appellate Court 
reviews the Trial Court's legal conclusions under a correction of error standard according 
those conclusions no particular deference. Englert v. Zane, 848 P.2d 165, 168 (Utah App. 
1993) (citing Bellon v. Malnar. 808 P.2d 1089, 1092 (Utah 1991)). 
B. The Measure of Performance in This Case Was Whether The Shares of 
Stock Tendered By The Trust Pursuant to The Real Estate Purchase 
Contract Ever Reached a Value During The Time Period September 18, 
1979 Through September 18, 1980 Such That Nagle Could Realize 
$85,000. 
In its Opinion reversing the Trial Court's November 6,2000 Order, the Appeals Court 
stated unequivocally: 
If, on remand, the fact finder determines that the 55,000 
shares were worth at least $85,000 at some point in the time 
between September 18,1979 and September 18,1980, and 
that [Nagle] was obligated to sell the shares at that time, 
then [the Trust] has performed [its] obligations and [Nagle] 
is not entitled to further relief. However, if the fact finder 
determines that the shares did not reach a value of $85,000 
within the appointed period, then [Nagle] is entitled to offset 
Brief.wpd -22-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the amount of the shortfall [the Trust] was obligated to pay 
in cash or additional shares against the value of the 
property. 
Addendum, Ex. B at f 27; R. 2428 (emphasis added). 
Accordingly, whether the Trust fully and unconditionally performed its obligations 
is measured by determining whether the shares of stock tendered by the Trust ever reached 
a value during the time in question so that Nagle could realize $85,000. 
The Trial Court, after hearing the evidence from both sides, held: "[T]he court finds 
that the value of the stock did not achieve $ .81 in the time frame to be considered by 
the court on remand from the appeals court. There is simply insufficient evidence." 
Addendum, Ex. C at p. 21, R. 2499 (emphasis added). The Trial Court further stated: 
"[T]he value of the stock is not in fact, and the court finds it to be a fact and a 
conclusion of law, readily ascertainable or calculable." Addendum, Ex. C at p. 21, 
R. 2499 (emphasis added). 
Since the value of the shares never reached a price where Nagle could realize $85,000, 
the Trust did not perform in the manner required by the express terms of the Real Estate 
Purchase Contract or in the manner set forth by the Appeals Court. Under long-standing 
Utah law, the Trust is not entitled to a decree for specific performance. Kelley, 846 P.2d at 
1243. Rather, Nagle is entitled to recoup title to the property because that was the status of 
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the parties until the Trial Court's November, 2000 Order requiring Nagle to convey title to 
the Trust. That Order was vacated in its entirety by the Appeals Court. 
C. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion in Granting The Trust Specific 
Performance. 
Notwithstanding its finding that the shares of stock did not reach a value sufficient to 
realize $85,000, and therefore that the Trust did not fully perform its contractual obligations, 
the Trial Court granted the Trust a decree for specific performance. It appears to have done 
this for the following reasons. 
First, the Trial Court concluded that Nagle could have sold the shares of stock for 
some value during the time period September 18,1979 to September 18,1980 but chose not 
to. Instead, the Trial Court concluded, Nagle was "speculating" in the stock value "and did 
nothing to attempt to sell even a portion of the stock when it would have realized some value 
" Addendum, Ex. C at p. 25, R. 2503. 
In reaching this conclusion, the Trial Court ignored the plain language of the contract: 
Title of premises being sold under the contract referred to above 
will be transferred when [Nagle] sells sufficient of the shares 
of Utah Coal & Chemical Corp. transferred under Addendum 
# 1 to realize $85,000 cash. [Nagle] hereby agrees to sell shares 
sufficient to realize $85,000 within one year of receipt thereof 
providing the market value of said shares will cause a 
realization of $85,000, 
Addendum, Ex. A, R. 2417 (emphasis added). 
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Under the plain language of the Real Estate Purchase Contract, Nagle had no 
obligation to sell any shares until they reached a value where he could realize $85,000. The 
shares never reached that value. Addendum, Ex. C. at p. 21, R. 2499. The parties bargained 
that in the event the shares could not realize $85,000 in the one year period, the Trust would 
pay $85,000 in cash or more shares. This conclusion is supported again by the plain 
language of the Contract: 
Should the value of the 55,000 shares conveyed not equal 
$85,000 within 1 year [the Trust] agrees to convey additional 
shares . . . or cash sufficient to bring the value conveyed to 
[Nagle] to $85,000 before [Nagle] conveys title 
Addendum, Ex. A, R. 2417 (emphasis added). 
The parties did not bargain that if the shares could not realize $85,000 Nagle would 
sell as many of the shares as he could, seek the remainder from the Trust and convey title to 
the Trust regardless. The Trust expressly assumed the risk that, prior to receiving title to the 
property, it would have to come up with $85,000 cash if the shares did not reach the agreed 
upon value. 
The Trial Court has effectively rewritten the parties' agreement so that it is Nagle—not 
the Trust—who must take affirmative action in the event the shares do not reach the agreed 
upon value, i.e., sell the shares and seek the difference from the Trust. The effect of this 
rewriting is to give the Trust the benefit of a bargain it did not perform while Nagle receives-
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-after the fact—the burden of a bargain to which he did not agree and never had a chance to 
perform. This result constitutes an abuse of the Trial Court's discretion. 
In fashioning the remedy it did, the Trial Court ignored well-settled rules of contract 
construction and equity. First, the Utah Supreme Court recently reaffirmed its long-standing 
principle that "we will not make a better contract for the parties than they have made 
for themselves . . . . Nor will we avoid the contract's plain language to achieve an 
'equitable' result." Bakowski v. Mountain States Steel Inc., 52 P.3d 1179, 1185 (Utah 
2002) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Second, "although a court, sitting in equity, 
exercises discretion in granting or denying relief..., it does not have the authority to 
ignore existing principles of law in favor of its view of the equities." Warner v. Sirstins. 
838 P.2d 666, 670 (Utah App. 1992) (emphasis added) (citing Jarvis v. State Land Dept's.. 
479 P.2d 169, 173 (Ariz. 1970)) ("equity obeys and conforms to the law's general rules 
and policies whether the common law or statute law") (emphasis added). See also Land 
v. Land, 605 P.2d 1248, 1251 (Utah 1980) ("Equity is not available to reinstate rights and 
privileges voluntarily contracted away simply because one has come to regret the bargain 
made"). Courts in other states have long held similar views. For example, in McCall v. 
Carlson, 172 P.2d 171, 187-88 (Nev. 1946), the Supreme Court of Nevada held: 
Our equitable powers do not extend so far as to permit us to 
* disregard fundamental principles of the law of contracts, or 
arbitrarily to force upon parties contractual obligations, 
terms or conditions which they have not voluntarily 
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assumed. In this regard, equity respects and upholds the 
fundamental right of the individual to complete freedom to 
contract or decline to do so, as he conceives to be for his best 
interests, so long as his contract is not illegal or against 
public policy. In this respect, and many others, equity 
follows the law. (Emphasis added). 
This equitable principle was recently reaffirmed in ARC LifeMed. Inc. v. AMC-
Tennessee. Inc.. 2005 WL 1819210 (Tenn. App. 2005). 
Similarly, the Court of Appeals of New Mexico recently stated: 
[T]he decision of which of two profit-seeking parties is more 
deserving to prevail is not within the province of the courts 
. . . . The written words of the contract afford greater 
certainty of intention, and more accurate compliance with 
the performance of the terms of the contracts by the parties 
thereto than do the retrospective, impassive conclusions of 
a court of equity. A court of equity . . . is bound by a 
contract as the parties have made it and has no authority to 
substitute for it another and different agreement, and should 
afford relief only where obviously there is fraud, real 
hardship, oppression, mistake, unconscionable results, and 
the other grounds of righteousness, justice and morality. 
United Properties Ltd. Co. v. Walgreen Properties, Inc.. 82 P.3d 535, 544 (N.M. App. 2003) 
(emphasis added). This authority from Utah and elsewhere demonstrates that the Trial Court 
committed reversible error by ignoring the express terms of the parties' agreement. 
The second factor the Trial Court erroneously focused on in fashioning its relief was 
the fact that the Trust consistently occupied the property from the time of the transaction in 
1978, including paying the mortgage and improvements, to the present. In relying on this 
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factor, the Trial Court once again ignored Nagle's rights under the Real Estate Purchase 
Contract. Specifically, once the Trust failed to perform in September, 1980 and certainly no 
later than it was notified that it was in default in January, 1981, Trial Ex. 105, Addendum Ex. 
D, R. 2430-31, Nagle was entitled to treat the Trust as a tenant-at-will. The Real Estate 
Purchase Contract expressly stated: 
[Nagle] shall have the right upon failure of the [Trust] to remedy 
the default within five days after written notice, to be released 
from all obligations in law and in equity to convey said property, 
and all payments which have been made theretofore on this 
contract by the [Trust], shall be forfeited to [Nagle] as liquidated 
damages for the nonperformance of the contract, and the 
[Trust] agrees that [Nagle] may at his option reenter and 
take possession of said premises without legal processes as in 
its first and former estate, together with all improvements 
and additions made by the [Trust] thereon, and the said 
additions and improvements shall remain with the land 
become [sicl the property of [Nagle], and the [Trust] 
becoming at once a tenant-at-will of [Nagle]. 
Addendum, Ex. A at f 16, R. 2415 (emphasis added). 
Indeed, Nagle viewed the Trust as a tenant-at-will, R. 106-07, and Nagle did not 
convey title to the Trust until ordered to do so by the Trial Court in its November 6, 2000 
Order. R. 529. Under these circumstances, it is appropriate to regard the mortgage payments 
the Trust made as rent. There was no evidence about what improvements were made on the 
property or what value they had, especially in the years before the Trust filed suit. Thus, that 
factor is not entitled to weight in this appeal. 
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Once again, the Trial Court is rewriting the parties' agreement to deprive Nagle of his 
rights under the contract in order to bestow a benefit in equity upon the Trust. The parties 
agreed that if there was a default, Nagle would be entitled to treat the Trust as a tenant. The 
Trust, therefore, assumed the risk that following notice of default, which the Trust received 
in January, 1981, Trial Ex. 105, Addendum, Ex. D, R. 2430-31, its payments would be 
treated as rent not equity. The Trust assumed that risk and received the benefit of a rent 
which stayed fixed even as the value of the property rose from $100,500 to over $380,000 
by the time of trial. R. 2619 at 346. The Trial Court's Order creates a risk for Nagle that he 
did not bargain for, namely that his contract right upon default to hold title and treat the 
Trust as a tenant-at-will would be transformed into an equitable basis to convey title to the 
Trust years after Nagle made his decision. 
The Trial Court was also influenced by the fact that the share price shortly before the 
transaction was almost sufficient to realize $85,000. This conclusion is based upon the Trial 
Court's erroneous determination that 105,000 shares were conveyed to Nagle under the Real 
Estate Purchase Contract. That erroneous determination is discussed in depth herein. See 
pp. 33-43. For the reasons stated there, the Trial Court's reliance on this factor is an abuse 
of discretion. 
Finally, the fact that the Trust conveyed the property to a family member does not 
support the Trial Court's decision at all. As will be discussed below, the Trust conveyed the 
Brief.wpd -29-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
property to an insider during the pendency of the first appeal. Moreover, that insider, K.N.B. 
Holdings, LLC, paid below fair market price for the property and took title with knowledge 
of this lis pendens. KNB therefore had actual and constructive knowledge of the risk that it 
could lose title to the property if the Trial Court's November 6,2000 Order was reversed, as 
it was. R. 2619 at 334. The Trust argued that KNB paid fair market value for the property. 
If this is true, then the Trust received fair market value for reselling the property even though 
it has yet to pay Nagle fair market value for that same property. It is difficult to see where 
equity is being done under these circumstances. 
In summary, the factors the Trial Court relied upon in fashioning its equitable remedy 
are at odds with long-standing principles of Utah law relating to specific performance, 
contract construction and the interplay of equity and law. These factors therefore do not 
support the remedy the Trial Court developed and the use of them under these circumstances 
constitutes an abuse of discretion wananting reversal in its entirety of the Trial Court's grant 
of specific performance. 
i-
Brief.wpd -30-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
II. ASSUMING THAT NAGLE IS ONLY ENTITLED TO A MONETARY 
REMEDY, THE TRIAL COURT STILL ERRED BY CALCULATING AN 
OFFSET BASED UPON WHAT NAGLE COULD HAVE SOLD THE SHARES 
OF STOCK FOR BECAUSE THE REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT 
EXPRESSLY PROVIDES THAT NAGLE WOULD NOT BE REQUIRED TO 
SELL THE SHARES UNTIL THEY REACHED A VALUE WHERE THEY 
COULD REALIZE $85,000 AND THAT NEVER HAPPENED. 
A. The Trial Court Determined That An Offset Should be Calculated Based 
Upon What The Trust Owed Nagle ($85,000) Minus What Nagle Could 
Have Sold The Stock For During The Time Period In Question. 
The Trial Court determined that Nagle was entitled an offset of $32,550. Addendum 
at Ex. C, R. 2505. The Trial Court determined that the offset should be based on what the 
Trust owed Nagle ($85,000) and what Nagle could have sold the shares he received for to 
make up the difference. Even assuming that the Trial Court was correct in deciding that 
Nagle may only recover a monetary remedy, it still abused its discretion in calculating the 
actual amount. 
B. The Real Estate Purchase Contract Expressly States That Nagle Is Not 
Required To Sell Shares Until They Reach a Value During The Time 
Period At Issue At Which Nagle Could Realize $85,000. 
As discussed previously, the Real Estate Purchase Contract did not require Nagle to 
sell his shares as payment for the property until those shares reached a value of $85,000. 
R. 2417. Yet, in fashioning an equitable remedy for the Trust, the Trial Court again 
penalized Nagle for doing something he had an express contractual right to do: Hold onto 
the shares until they reached a value where he could realize $85,000. 
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Moreover, the offset in no way accounts for the appreciation of the property over time. 
The property is currently worth approximately $380,000. R. 2619 at 346. Thus, under the 
Trial Court's Order, the Trust is allowed to purchase the property at substantially less than 
fair market value both at the time of the contract because it did not pay the $85,000 owed and 
today because it did not have to pay the $85,000 or that sum in today's value. Yet, when the 
Trust sold the property to KNB, it received and kept for itself what it considered to be fair 
market value. This is not equitable. This is contrary to the principles of equity and contract 
construction discussed above. 
C. The Correct Offset Amount Should Be At Least Be The Unpaid Purchase 
Price Plus Interest. 
In discussing an offset remedy, the Appeals Court made clear any offset should consist 
of "the amount of the shortfall [the Trust] was obligated to pay." Addendum, Ex. B at f 27, 
R. 2428. The Trust is obligated to pay at least $85,000 because it has never paid any of that 
amount. Therefore, any offset amount should, at the very least, start with the $85,000 the 
Trust undeniably owes Nagle for its failure to fully perform its obligations. Nagle is further 
entitled to the time value of that $85,000 over the years. The simplest way to measure this 
would be the statutory interest rate in effect at the time of the breach under U.C. A. § 15-1-1, 
8 % per annum. The applicable time period would be from September, 1980, the time of the 
breach to the present. 
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Even if this Court determined that Nagle is not entitled to recoup title to the property 
as a remedy for the Trust's nonperformance, the property should still be made available to 
Nagle to satisfy any monetary judgment this Court may order. This is appropriate because 
KNB is in privity with the Trust. See Statement of Fact No. 8; Press Pub,. Ltd. v. Matol 
Botanical Intern., Ltd., 37 P.3d 1121,1128 (Utah 2001) (a finding of privity depends mostly 
on the parties "relationship to the subject matter of the litigation"). A contrary ruling would 
mean that a privy of the Trust gets the full value of the property for which the Trust did not 
pay while Nagle is denied a remedy to satisfy a judgment he is undeniably owed. Moreover, 
because the principal of that privy is a close family member of beneficiaries of the Trust, the 
Trust essentially maintains access to the property and enjoys its benefits. R. 2819 at 330. 
That result is not equitable. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE TRUST HAD 
CONVEYED 105,000 SHARES OF STOCK TO NAGLE AS PART OF THE 
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT. 
A. The Trial Court's Ruling Is Contrary To The Law of The Case. 
In its November 6, 2000 Order, the Trial Court found as a matter of undisputed fact, 
based on its review of a complete factual record, that the Trust conveyed 55,000 shares of 
Utah Coal & Chemical stock to Nagle as part of its obligations under the Real Estate 
Purchase Contract. R. 524. The Appeals Court expressly adopted this finding in its 
November, 2002 Opinion. Addendum, Ex. B at f 20, R. 2425. No new evidence was 
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introduced at the June, 2005 trial on the issue of how many shares were tendered. 
Notwithstanding these express findings, the Trial Court ruled that 105,000 shares were 
conveyed. Addendum, Ex. C at p. 13, R. 2491. This ruling is contrary to the law of the case. 
The law of the case doctrine is a legal doctrine under which a decision made on an 
issue during one stage of a case is binding in successive stages of the same litigation. Plumb 
v. State, 809 P.2d 734, 739 (Utah 1990). The doctrine was developed in the interests of 
economy and efficiency to avoid the delays and difficulties involved in repetitious 
contentions and reconsideration of rulings on matters previously decided in the same case. 
Richardson v. Grand Central Corp.. 572 P.2d 395, 397 (Utah 1977). 
One element of the law of the case doctrine is known as the "mandate rule." This rule 
dictates that legal pronouncements of an appellate court on legal issues in a case become the 
law of the case and must be followed in subsequent proceedings of that case. Petty v. Clark, 
192 P.2d 589, 594 (Utah 1948). The lower court must not depart from the mandate, and any 
change with respect to the legal issues governed by the mandate must be made by the 
appellate court that established it or by a court to which it, in turn, owes obedience. State v. 
Lopes, 34 P.3d 762, 766 (Utah 2001). The lower court must implement both the letter and 
the spirit of the mandate, taking into account the Appeals Court's Opinion and the 
circumstances it embraces. Street v. Fourth Judicial Dist. Court, 191 P.2d 153, 159 (Utah 
1948). 
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The legal issue decided by the Appeals Court in its November, 2002 Opinion was 
under what parameters the Trial Court would determine whether the Trust performed its 
contractual obligations or not. Specifically, the Appeals Court held: 
To allow [the Trust] to breach one of [its] obligations under the 
contract, then, years later—after never having brought suit to 
have title conveyed—to obtain title without having to perform 
[its] other obligations under the same contract, is not equitable. 
If, on remand, the fact finder determines that the 55,000 
shares were worth at least $85,000 at some point in time 
between September 18,1979 and September 18,1980, and 
that [Nagle] was obligated to sell the shares at that time, 
then [the Trust] has performed [its] obligations and [Nagle] 
is not entitled to further relief. However, if the fact finder 
determines that the shares did not reach a value of $85,000 
within the appointed period, then [Nagle] is entitled to offset 
the amount of the shortfall [the Trust] was obligated to pay 
in cash or additional shares against the value of the 
property. 
Addendum, Ex. B at fflf 26-27, R. 2427-28 (emphasis added). 
There is nothing in this ruling inviting the Trial Court to revisit the issue of how many 
shares were tendered as part of the transaction. The Appeals Court, based upon the Trial 
Court's findings of fact in its November 6,2000 Order, determined the number of shares at 
issue already decided. The parties took no additional discovery after the Trial Court entered 
its November, 2000 Order and no new evidence was presented at the June, 2005 trial on this 
subject that was not already part of the record in November, 2000. For the Trial Court to 
make new findings on old evidence, as it has done, is to stray from the issue as framed by the 
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Appeals Court. This violates the mandate rule under long-standing Utah law. Lopes, 34 P.3d 
at 766; see also Sittner v. Big Horn Tar Sands & Oil Inc.. 692 P.2d 735, 736 (Utah 1984). 
There are exceptional circumstances under which a lower court can revisit issues 
already decided. They are narrowly defined under Utah law and consist of the following: 
(1) When there has been an intervening change of controlling authority; (2) when new 
evidence has become available; or (3) when the court is convinced that its prior decision was 
clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice. Gillmor v. Wright 850 P.2d 431,439 
(Utah 1993). (Per Orme, J. concurring.) 
None of these considerations is present here. Indeed, the Trial Court did not even 
attempt to justify its findings under the law of the case doctrine. There was no intervening 
change of authority; there was no new evidence presented at trial and there was no showing 
that a manifest injustice would result from following the Appeals Court's Opinion. The Trial 
Court's decision was contrary to the law of the case doctrine and should be reversed. 
B. The Trial Court's Ruling That The Trust Conveyed 105,000 Shares Is 
Barred By The Statute of Frauds. 
Both Addendum No. 1 and No. 2 to the Real Estate Purchase Contract clearly 
contemplate that the Trust will convey 55,000 shares of stock to pay the remaining $85,000 
due and owing. Addendum, Ex. A, R. 2416-17. Notwithstanding this unequivocal evidence 
of the parties' intent and absent any other written document drafted by the parties evidencing 
a change in intent, the Trial Court concluded that the parties actually agreed to something 
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else. In other words, the Trial Court concluded that the parties had orally modified their 
contract to provide that the Trust would convey 105,000 shares to pay off the remaining 
$85,000. 
Under Utah law, "parties to a contract may, by mutual consent, modify any or all of 
a contract." Harris v. IES Associates. Inc.. 69 P.3d 297, 310 (Utah App. 2003V "A valid 
modification of a contract requires a meeting of the minds of the parties, which must 
be spelled out, either expressly or impliedly with sufficient definiteness." Id. (citations 
omitted) (emphasis added). It is the Trust's burden to prove the parties' mutual assent to 
modify the Real Estate Purchase Contract to provide for delivery of 105,000 shares. Harris, 
69 P.3d at 310. The Trust has not carried that burden. 
However, even if the parties properly modified the contract, the modification is 
unenforceable because it is barred by the Utah Statute of Frauds. U.C.A. § 25-5-3. That 
provision states: 
Every contract for the leasing for a longer period than one year, 
or for the sale, of any lands, or any interest in lands, shall be 
void unless the contract, or some note or memorandum thereof, 
is in writing subscribed by the party by whom the lease or sale 
is to be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized in 
writing. 
It is well-settled under Utah law that "if an original agreement is within the statute 
of frauds, a subsequent agreement which modifies the original written agreement must 
also satisfy the requirements of the statute of frauds to be enforceable." Golden Key 
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Realty. Inc. v. Mantas. 699 P.2d 730, 732 (Utah 1985); R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook. 40 P.3d 
1119, 1124 (Utah 2002) (emphasis added). There is no question that the original contract 
between the parties needed to be, and was, in writing. Thus, the purported modification 
needed to be in writing. Even assuming it existed at all, the fact that it was not in writing 
renders it unenforceable. Accordingly, the Trial Court's conclusion that 105,000 shares were 
tendered under the contract is based on an unenforceable agreement and is an invalid 
conclusion of law and finding of fact. 
C. The Trial Court's Ruling Is Against The Weight Of Evidence And Is 
Clearly Erroneous. 
There is no document signed by the parties acknowledging a modification to the Real 
Estate Purchase Contract. Rather, the evidence offered by the Trust to support its claimed 
modification consists of the following: 
1. Trial Ex. 14, a document dated September 18,1979 indicating the registration 
of 105,000 shares of Utah Coal & Chemical stock in Gary Nagle's name; and 
j 2. Trial Ex. 11, Nagle's Answers to the Trust's First Set of Interrogatories dated 
January 26, 2000, particularly Interrogatory No. 7. 
This evidence does not support the Trial Court's conclusion of modification for 
several reasons. First, Trial Ex. 14 was not prepared by the parties and no foundation was 
laid that the document reflected the necessary mutual assent of the parties to modify their 
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agreement. To the contrary, the document merely shows that 105,000 shares were registered 
on a particular day. 
Trial Ex. 11, the interrogatory Answer, is even less helpful. Interrogatory No. 7 has 
ten subparts to it, each of which seeks a significant amount of information dating back over 
twenty years. The Trust suggested through questioning of Gary Nagle at trial that because 
the answer did not expressly indicate that 50,000 shares of the 105,000 registered were 
purchased in a separate agreement, therefore they were all part of the Real Estate Purchase 
Contract. R. 2618 at 187. But this is argument. It is not evidence to show mutual assent. 
Moreover, both Gary Nagle and Doug Rex testified that 55,000 shares were part of the 
contract and the remaining 50,000 were separately purchased but delivered and registered at 
the same time. R. 2618, 179-80, 212-213; R. 2619 at 337. It is true that the Trial Court is 
not required to believe that testimony but discounting testimony does not mean that the 
obverse of it is true. 
Moreover, in focusing on Nagle's inability to produce documentation showing he 
paid separately for the additional 50,000 shares registered on September 18, 1979, the Trial 
Court unfairly shifted the burden of proof to him and then drew an adverse inference from 
his inability to meet that burden. Addendum, Ex. C at p. 14, R. 2492. As stated, it is the 
Trust's burden to prove modification of the contract. Harris, 69 P.3d at 310. Finally, the 
Trial Court's determination that the parties understood that more shares would be needed to 
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reach $85,000 given the trading price at the time is sheer conjecture. Addendum, Ex. C at 
p. 13, R. 2591. Moreover, it ignores the fact that the stock was "penny stock" whose primary 
appeal to investors is its highly speculative nature. 
The Trial Court also ignored the evidence presented by Nagle that the Trust 
understood the transaction involved only 55,000 shares. For example, in Trial Ex. 108, 
Addendum, Ex. E, R. 2477, counsel for the Trust acknowledged in January, 1981 that the 
transaction involved only 55,000 shares. Counsel is now arguing that the transaction actually 
was for 105,000 shares. Moreover, as discussed below, the Trust admitted in numerous 
pleadings that the transaction involved 55,000 shares only. See, e^g., the Trial Court's 
November 6, 2000 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, R. 524-25, which the Trust 
prepared. Finally, both addenda to the contract specifically reference 55,000 shares. 
The Trial Court made several references in its June 10 Memorandum and Order to the 
Trust's good faith belief as to the value of the stock. See, e.g.. Addendum, Ex. C at p. 24, 
R. 2502. Yet, there is absolutely no evidence in the record reflecting LeRoy Collard's belief 
or understanding about the value of the stock at the time of the transaction at all and none is 
identified by the Trial Court. Mr. Collard did not testify at trial because he is deceased and 
there are no contemporaneous records which reflect what he actually thought of the stock. 
The Trial Court ignored the weight of the evidence and its finding that 105,000 shares of 
stock were transferred is clearly erroneous. 
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D. The Trust Is Bound By Its Judicial Admission That Only 55,000 Shares 
Were Conveyed Under The Real Estate Purchase Contract. 
Throughout this case, the Trust has continually acknowledged both formally and 
informally that only 55,000 shares were conveyed to Nagle under the terms of the Real Estate 
Purchase Contract. Indeed, in findings of fact and conclusions of law it prepared for the 
Trial Court's signature in November, 2000, the Trust stated that the real estate purchase 
transaction involved 55,000 shares. R. 524-25. 
The Trust did not raise the issue of 105,000 shares until the eve of trial in its 
Rule 26(a)(4) Disclosures it submitted, R. 2077, and then, more clearly, in a "Pretrial Order" 
it unilaterally filed in May, 2005 just before trial. R. 2127. Nagle objected to Plaintiffs' Rule 
26(a)(4) disclosures, R.2103, filed an Objection and Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' "Pretrial 
Order," R. 2376, and objected at trial to this evidence, R. 2619 at 98. The Trial Court 
overruled those objections. R. 2618 at 98. 
A judicial admission is "a formal, deliberate declaration which a party or his attorney 
makes in a judicial proceeding for the purpose of dispensing with proof of formal matters or 
of facts about which there is no real dispute." Gordon v. Benson. 925 P.2d 775, 781 (Colo. 
1996). "An admission of fact in a pleading is a judicial admission and is normally conclusive 
on the party making it." Baldwin v. Vantage Corp., 676 P.2d 413, 415 (Utah 1984). The 
Trust admitted numerous times that the transaction involved 55,000 shares. See, ej*., R. 524-
25. Nagle has never acted in any way which suggests that he believed that any more than 
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55,000 shares were conveyed under the contract. The Trust should not be allowed to ignore 
its admissions to raise an issue on the eve of trial that was wholly inconsistent with the 
position it had adopted during the previous six years of this litigation. Indeed, it should be 
estopped from doing so. See Stevenson v. Goodson, 924 P.2d 339, 352 (Utah 1996) ("The 
principle of judicial estoppel prevents a party from seeking judicial relief by uttering 
statements inconsistent with its own sworn statement in a prior judicial proceeding") 
(emphasis added). 
E. The Trial Court's Erroneous Conclusion Was Material To Its Ruling. 
The Trial Court's erroneous conclusion that the parties agreed the Trust would convey 
105,000 as part of the transaction was material to its decision in at least two ways. 
First, one of the equitable considerations underlying the Trial Court's decision to grant 
the Trust specific performance was based on how close the Court thought the Trust came to 
actually performing. If, as the Appeals Court determined, the Trust conveyed 55,000 shares, 
those shares would have had to reach a value of over approximately $1.54 per share during 
the time period at issue to realize $85,000. If, as the Trial Court determined, the Trust 
conveyed 105,000 shares then the share price needed only to reach 81 0 per share. The Trial 
Court acknowledged that the shares never reached either price during the time in question 
but the price did approach and occasionally exceed 81 0 per share prior to the time period set 
forth in Addendum No. 2. Addendum at Ex. C at pp. 24-25, R. 2502-03. This factor among 
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others persuaded the Trial Court that: "Plaintiffs failures were in degree rather than a failure 
to perform or partially perform." Addendum at Ex. C at p. 24, R. 2502. In other words, 
according to the Trial Court, the Trust is entitled to specific performance because it almost 
performed. 
Significantly, the Trial Court rejected the evidence offered by the Trust that the stock 
traded at $1.62 per share during the time in question. Addendum, Ex. C at p. 17, R. 2495. 
Obviously, then, the Trial Court' s conclusion that 105,000 shares had been conveyed affected 
its evaluation of the equitable considerations presented by the parties because if only 55,000 
shares were tendered, the Trust did not "almost" perform. Rather, the Trust never came close 
to performing and a decree for specific performance would be wholly unwarranted. Kelley, 
846P.2datl243. 
Second, even if the Trial Court is correct that Nagle's offset should be calculated 
based on the fact that he could have sold shares for some value, and even if the Court's 
determination that the average price per share during the one year time period was 500 is 
correct, the erroneous conclusion that the contract involved 105,000 shares substantially 
lessened the offset Nagle received. If the deal involved 55,000 shares Nagle's offset, 
according to the Trial Court's methodology, is $57,500 ($85,000 minus $27,500 realized 
from the sale of 55,000 shares). The Trial Court's conclusion that the offset is $32,500 
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(based on the sale of 105,000 shares) deprives Nagle of approximately $25,000 of recovery. 
This is manifestly unfair to Nagle and constitutes an abuse of discretion by the Trial Court. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THE TRUST BEHAVED 
EQUITABLY WHEN IT CONVEYED THE PROPERTY TO AN INSIDER OF 
THE TRUST DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE FIRST APPEAL WHO 
PAID LESS THAN FAIR MARKET VALUE AND TOOK THE PROPERTY 
WITH ACTUAL NOTICE OF NAGLE'S LIS PENDENS. 
On January 18, 2001, the Trust conveyed the property to KNB Holdings, LLC 
("KNB"). At that time, Nagle had already filed a Notice of Appeal on the Trial Court's 
November 6,2000 Order and Nagle had already placed a lis pendens on the property. R 2619 
at 331. The sole member and manager of KNB is Kirk Blosch who is married to a 
beneficiary of the Trust and is the brother-in-law of the Trustee. R. 2619 at 330. Mr. Blosch, 
an experienced real estate developer, paid $230,000 for the property pursuant to an oral 
agreement. R. 2618 at 67; R. 2619 at 330. KNB purchased the property with actual 
knowledge of the lis pendens. R. 2619 at 331. The purchase price was based upon an 
appraisal that was conducted two years earlier with a discount of 7.5 % to account for the lis 
pendens. R. 2619 at 334. As such, the purchase price is well below fair meirket value. 
Given the experience of Kirk Blosch in real estate development matters, the below fair 
market amount paid for the property, the lack of documentation concerning the transaction 
and the timing of the transaction, the more obvious inference to be drawn is that the purpose 
of the conveyance from the Trust to KNB was to keep the property out of Nagle's reach in 
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the event of an adverse ruling from the Appeals Court yet simultaneously to enable the 
beneficiaries of the Trust to maintain constructive possession of and access to the property. 
Indeed, the Appeals Court originally believed that offset was the only remedy available to 
the Trust because the property had been conveyed to a "third-party." See Collard v. Nagle. 
57 P.3d 603,608 (Utah App. 2002).1 It was only because Nagle filed with the Appeals Court 
a Motion for Clarification of its Opinion that the Appeals Court eliminated the restriction on 
Nagle's ability to recoup title to the property. R. 2418; R. 2619 at 327. Similarly, the Trial 
Court referred to this conveyance as another reason why Nagle should not receive title as a 
remedy for the Trust's nonperformance. Addendum, Ex. C at p. 24, R. 2502. 
A long-standing rule in equity jurisprudence is that a party who seeks an equitable 
remedy must have acted in good faith and not in violation of equitable principles. Hone v. 
Hone, 95 P.3d 1221, 1223 (Utah App. 2004) (citing Park v. James, 364 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah 
1961)). The Trial Court erred in determining that the Trust had behaved equitably in 
conveying the property to an insider during the pendency of the appeal for below fair market 
value. 
1
 This opinion is not the corrected opinion of November, 2002, Addendum, Ex. B; 
R. 2^418-30. 
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V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT AWARDING NAGLE 
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST BECAUSE THE AMOUNT OWED WAS A 
FIXED AMOUNT AT THE TIME THE TRUST DEFAULTED AND 
INTEREST CAN BE CALCULATED WITH MATHEMATICAL, ACCURACY. 
Under Utah law, prejudgment interest represents an amount awarded as damages due 
to a defendant's delay in tendering an amount clearly owing under an agreement or other 
obligation. Bakerv. Data Phase. Inc.. 781 F. Supp. 724,731 (D. Utah 1992); L&ADrvwall. 
Inc. v. Whitmore Constr. Co.. 608 P.2d 626, 629 (Utah 1980). A court may award 
prejudgment interest where the loss is fixed as of a particular time and the amount of the loss 
can be calculated with mathematical accuracy. Baker. 781 F. Supp. at 731. A Trial Court's 
decision to grant or deny prejudgment interest presents a question of law which is reviewed 
for correctness. Lvon v. Burton. 5 P.3d 616, 636 (Utah 2000). 
With respect to the criteria Utah courts look at when awarding prejudgment interest, 
the Utah Supreme Court has held: 
The true test to be applied as to whether interest should be 
allowed before judgment in a given case or not is, therefore, 
not whether the damages are unliquidated or otherwise, but 
whether the injury and consequent damages are complete 
and must be ascertained as of a particular time and in 
accordance with fixed rules of evidence and known 
standards of value, which the court or jury must follow in 
fixing the amount, rather than be guided by their best 
judgment in assessing the amount to be allowed for past as 
well as for future injury, or for elements that cannot be 
measured by any fixed standards of value. 
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Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc.. 82 P.3d 1064,1069 (Utah 2003) (citations omitted) (emphasis 
added). 
The parties agreed in Addendum No. 2 to the Real Estate Purchase Contract that if the 
shares tendered did not reach a value sufficient to realize $85,000 during the specified time 
period, the Trust would be required to tender $85,000 in cash. That is a fixed sum certain. 
There is no dispute that in January, 1981, Nagle notified the Trust that it was in default under 
the Real Estate Purchase Contract because the shares could not be sold to realize $85,000. 
Trial Ex. 105, Addendum, Ex. D, R. 2477. The Trust did not cure that default. Prejudgment 
interest is easily calculable by simply multiplying $85,000 by the time period until judgment 
is entered at 8 % (the applicable rate of interest at the time the contract was signed under 
U.C.A. § 15-1-1). Because Nagle's loss can be calculated with mathematical certainty, he 
is entitled to prejudgment interest. 
The Trial Court determined that because the judgment Nagle received was the offset 
amount which had not yet been calculated, he was not entitled to prejudgment interest. 
Addendum, Ex. C. at p. 30, R. 2508. The Trial Court's conclusion concerning offset is 
incorrect and has been discussed elsewhere in this brief. See pp. 30-33. 
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VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT AWARDING NAGLE ATTORNEY'S 
FEES AS PREVAILING PARTY. 
The Real Estate Purchase Contract gives the prevailing party the right to seek 
reasonable attorney's fees. Addendum, Ex. A at f 17, R. 2415. Under Utah law, courts 
examine the following factors to determine which litigant is a prevailing party: (1) The 
contractual language; (2) the number of claims, counterclaims, cross-claims, etc. brought by 
the parties; (3) the importance of the claims relative to each other and their significance in 
the context of the lawsuit considered as a whole; and (4) the dollar amounts attached to and 
awarded in connection with the various claims. R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook,, 40 P.3d 1119, 
1127 (Utah 2002). 
The central issue in this case is whether the 55,000 shares conveyed by the Trust to 
Nagle ever reached a value where Nagle could realize $85,000. The Trust was unable to 
carry its burden on this point. Addendum, Ex. C at p. 21, R. 2499. The next issue related to 
whether Nagle was entitled to an offset. Nagle first argued that he was entitled to recoup title 
to the property as a remedy for the Trust's non-performance. In the alternative, however, he 
argued that he was entitled to a monetary offset. The Trial Court granted an offset to Nagle 
although Nagle sharply objects to the method by which the court calculated it. Addendum, 
Ex. C at p. 25, R. 2503. Nevertheless, Nagle has received some of the relief he asked for. 
The upshot of these rulings is that Nagle was able to require the Trust to take action 
to complete the purchase of the property. In contrast, the Trust has argued consistently that 
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it had already performed and owed nothing further. See, e,g., R. 2618 at 31. Under the 
circumstances, Nagle is the prevailing party and is entitled to an award of reasonable 
attorney's fees. 
CONCLUSION 
As has been amply demonstrated, the Trial Court made numerous material errors in 
rendering its judgment in this case. These errors, standing alone and taken together, warrant 
a complete reversal of the Trial Court5 s judgment. Nagle respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse the Trial Court's August 15,2005 judgment and award title to the property to Nagle 
along with attorney's fees and all other costs and fees incurred in this action, including the 
costs of this appeal. Alternatively, if this Court determines that Nagle is not entitled to 
recoup title to the property but is only entitled to a monetary remedy, Nagle respectfully 
requests that he be awarded the full $85,000 due and owing plus interest, including pre-
judgment interest, secured by the property, along with the other relief previously requested. 
Either of these results will ensure that the parties both provide and receive what they 
bargained for. In this way will equity truly be accomplished. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /6> day of December, 2005. 
By f^^\, 
Sean N. Egan 
Attorney for Appellants/Defendants F 
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"THIS IS A l l t A U Y J»NO!N& CONTRACT. I* NC* VNDmTCOO. Sf !< C O M » S T £ N T AOVICE." 
UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT 
1. THIS AGREEMENT, made in duplicate this -<<r 
by ^d between NaRle Construction Company Inc. 
l £ day J^22M±Z£—. A. D, ••!!&' 
hereinafter designated a. the Seller, and - H E t t SfiaOlga 2 t t 8 » » " • H o l l o w D r . 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8U09 
hereinafter aMif..ud as the Buyer. of one condominium unit (no. Br2L) i n Cove Point 
a Planned Conrnurdty Development 38/*2 Quail Hollow Dr. SLC, UT 
2 WITNESSETH: That the Seller, for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to sell and convey to the buyer, 
and the buyer for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to purchase the following described real property, situate m 
the county of . . S a l t I*Ke S u t . of Utah, to-wit: K& O^Xl H o l l o v ^ D r . gLC, UT 
Mora particularly described as follows: 
Condominium unit no. B-24( a Planned Unit Development) 
Legal Description: 
Al l of Lot B-24 Cove Point Phase One a Planned Unit Development according to the 
Off ic ia l Plat thereof, dated May 13, 1976 f i led and recorded May 26, 1976 in 
Book 76-5 page 118 records of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
Together with a l l rights and responsibilities of membership i n the Cove Point 
Homes Association, a nonprofit corporation as provided in the articles of 
Corporation, Bylaws, Declaration of Covenants, conditions and restrictions 
*&AfBi3ftJWWt/IOrtW ,HKa&r .17& fir jfip&i&l fifgstk mfflrsteL-
I ! 
I i 
I 
Hundred Thousand Five Hundred Dollars <$129ii5^i59—) 
payable at the office of Seller, Ms asstfns ar order _ 
strictly within the following times, to-wit: TCT\ TtlQUSand P<?UarS „ ( $ 1 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 ) 
cash, the receipt of which Is hereby acknowledged, and the baUnce of $ 9Qi5QQiQ0 shall be paid as follows: 
per attached: \.. 
cont'd. Legal Description-
records of Salt lake County, State of Utah. 
Subject t o */n of the Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions, and easements contained 
and set forth i n the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions dated 
May 13, 1976 and recorded May 26, 1976 in Book 4212 page 277-287 records of 
Sal t Lake County, State of Utah. j j 
t o * e a i o t i «* s*d^>r«mne^sh\lW)e«dei\yc\eff to*b*ye* oft tfte » » • • » • » Av«V>f» « « » » » • » « rt, * • . \ '• 
4. Said monthly payment* are to be applied first to the payment of interest and second to the reduction of the j ' 
principal. Interest shall be charfed from on all unpaid portions of the | i 
purchase price at the rate of _ w m m « _ _ — — per cent ( r« > per annum. The Buyer, at his option at anytime, 
may pay amounts in excess of the monthly payments upon the unpaid balance subject to the limlutions of any mortgage 
or contract by the Buyer herein assumed, such excess to be applied either to unpaid principal or in prepayment of future 
installments at the election of the buyer, which election must be made at the time the excess payment Is made. 
5. It is understood and agreed that If the Seller accepts payment from the Buyer on this contract less than according 
to tha terms herein mentioned, then by so doing. It will in no way alter the terms of the contract as to the forfeiture 
hereinafter stipulated, or as to any other remedies of the seller. 
6. It b understood that there presently exists an.obligation against said property in favor of .. F l f S t S e c u r i t y 
B a n k i with an unpaid balance of 
I 59,958.75 .euHwr which buyer wi l l assume
 : 
7. Seller represents that there are no unpaid special improvement district taxes covering Improvements to said prem-
ises now in the process of b«mg installed, or which have been completed and not paid for, outstanding against said prop-
erty, except the following - '. J I 
8. The Seller Is given the option to secure, execute and maintain loans seeurcd by said property of not to cxce«d the • j 
then unpaid contract balance hereunder, bearing Interest at the rate of not to eaeeod percent : 
( %) per annum and payable In regular monthly installments: provided that the agrregate monthly installment | j 
payments required to be made by Seller on said loans shall not be greater than each installment payment required to be i 
made by the Buyer under this contracL When the prlncip>J'due hereunder has been reduced to the amount of any such | ' 
loans and mortgages the Seller agrees to convey and the Buyer agrees to accept title to the above described property 
subject in mm\A l*an.<« »n#i mnrtg****. , ; 
9. If the Buyer desires to exercise his right through accelerated payments under this agreement to pay off any obli- : • 
gations outstanding at date of this agreement against said property, it shall be the Buyer's obligation to assume and j '• 
pay any penalty which may be required on prepayment of said prior obligations. Prepayment penalties in respect • J 
to obligations against said property incurred by seller, after date of this agreement, shall be paid by seller unless ) • 
said obligations are assumed or approved by buyer. • 
10. The Buyer agrees upon written request of the Seller to make application to a reliable lender (or a loan of such [ 
amount a.i can be secured under the regulations of said lender and hereby agrees to apply any amount so received upon • 
the purchase price Above mentioned, and to execute the papers required and pay one-half the expenses necessary in ob- I ' 
tainfng said loan, the Seller agreeing to pay the other one-half, provided however, that the monthly payments and I : 
Interest rate required, shall not exceed the monthly payments and Interest rate as outlined above. ' 
. **• T** B u * « r • l « t l U pev aU taxes and assessments of every kind and nature which are or which may be assessed ; • 
and which may become due on these premises 4nrit\t the life of this agreement. The Seller hereby covenants and arrees » i 
that there are no assessments against said premises except the following: 
The Seller further covenants and arrets tklt he will not default In the payment of his obligations against said property. j j 
[ ' 
trr 
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j 
I 
12. T h t Buytr a r r e t s to pay tht fftntral u x t s a f t er . 1977 
13. Tht Buytr further sprees to keep all insurablt buildings and improvement* on said premises insured in a com- j 
pany acceptable to tht Seller in the amount of not less than tht unpaid balance on this contract, or t_ 
and to ass ign said insurance to tht Seller as his interests m a y appear and to deliver tht insurance policy to him. 
14. Jn tht event the Buyer ahall default in the payment of any special or f eneral taxes, assessments or insurance 
premiums as herein provided, the Seller may. at his option, pay said taxes, assessments and insurance premiums or cither 
ol th tm. ar.d if Seller elects so to do, then the Buyer agrees to repay the Seller upon demand, all such sums so advanced 
and paid by him, together with interest thereon from date of payment of said sums at the rate of X of one percent per 
month until paid. 
15. Buyer agrees that he will not commit or suffer to be committed any waste, spoil, or destruction in or upon 
said premises, and that he will maintain said premises in good condition. 
16. In the event of a failure to comply with he terms hereof by the Buyer, or upon failure ot the Buyer to c a k e 
ii 
any payment or payments when tht same shall becomt due. or within . 
Seller, at his option ahall have tht. following alternative remedies: 
. days thereafter, the 
A. Seller shall have the right, upon failure of the Buytr to remedy the default within five days after written notice, 
to be released from all obligations in law and in equity to convey said property, and all payments which have 
been made theretofore on this contract by the Buyer, shall be forfeited to the Seller as liquidated damages for 
the non-performance of the contract, and the Buyer agrees that the Seller may at his option re-enter and take 
possession of said premises without legal processea as in its first and former estate, together with a!! improve-
ments and additions made by the Buyer thereon, and the said additions and improvements shall remain with 
the land become the property of the Seller, the Buyer becoming at once a tenant a t will of the Seller; or 
B. The Seller may bring suit and recover Judgment for all delinquent installments, including costs and attorneys 
1tt*. (The use of this remedy on one or mort occasions shall not prevent the Seller, at his option, from re so rune; 
to one of the other remedies hereunder in the event of a subsequent de fau l t ) : or 
C. The Seller shall have the right, at h b option, and upon written notice to tht Buyer, to declare the entire unpaid 
balance hereunder at once due and payable, and may elect to treat this contract as a note and mortgage, and pass 
t it le to the Buyer subject thereto, and proceed immediately to foreclose the same in accordance with the laws of 
the Slate of Utah, and have the property sold ar.d the proceeds applied to the payment of the batsnee owing, 
including costs and attorney's fees: and the Seller may have a judgment for any deficiency which may remain. 
In the case of foreclosure, the Seller hereunder, upon tne filing of a complaint, shall be immediately entitled to 
the appointment of a receiver to take possession of said mortgaged property and collect the rents, issues and 
profits therefrom and apply the same to the payrr.er.; of the obligation hereunder, or hold the same pursuant 
to order of ::he court; and the Seller, upon entry of judgment of foreclosure, shall be entitled to the possession 
of the said premises during the period of redemption. 
17. It is agreed that time U the essence of this agreement. 
18. In the event, there are any liens or encumbrances against said premises other than these herein provided for or 
referred to. or in the event any liens or encumbrances other than herein provided for shall hereafter accrue against the 
same by acts or neglect of the Seller, then the Buyer may, ac h b option, pay and discharge the same and receive credit 
on the amount then remaining due hereunder in the amount of any such payment or payments and thereafter the pay-
ments herein provided to be made, may, at the option of the Buyer, be suspended until such time as such suspended 
payments shall equal any sums advanced aa aforesaid. 
19. The Seller on receiving the payments herein reserved to be paid at the time and in the manner above mentioned 
agrees to execute and deliver to the Buyer or assigns, a good and sufficient warranty deed conveying the title to the 
above described premises free and dear of all encumbrances except as herein mentioned and except as may have accrued 
by or through the acts or neglect of the Buyer, and to furnish at his expense, a policy of title insurance in the amount 
of the purchase price or at the option of the Seller, an abstract brought to date at time of sale or at any time during the 
term of this agreement, or at time of delivery of deed, a: the option of Buyer. 
CO. It is hereby expressly understood and agreed by the parties hereto that the Buyer accepts the said property 
in its present condition and that there are no representations, covenants, or agreements between the parties hereto with 
reference to said property except as herein specifically set forth or attached hereto 
21. The Buyer and Setter each agree that should they default jn any of the covenants or agreement! contained here-
in, that the defaulting party shall pay all cosU and expenses, including a reasonable attorney's fee. which may a rue 
or accrue from enforcing this agreement, or in obtaining- possession of the premises covered hereby, or in pursuing any 
remedy provided hereunder or by the statutes of the State of Utah whether such remedy is pursued by filing a suit 
or otherwise. 
22. It is understood that the stipulations aforesaid are to apply to and bind the heirs, executors, administrators, suc-
cessors, and assigns of the respective,-parties hereto. 
IN W I T N E S S WHEREOF, the said parties to this agreement have hereunto signed tbeir names, the day and year 
first above written. 
Signed in the presence of 
i j ^ U v p Vf\V.-vKJr\ Baals Cgnartruetion Company Inc. 
.. • ^j..fC. „\S«II«W/ f 
. , . Buyer 
O 
3 
TO 
to 
n 
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n 
M\ 
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Addendum #1 
To Real Estate Contract between Nagle Construction Compnay and 
LeRoy Collard. Dated - ?S ?<? ?s/l- • >V*. f O 7$ 
Paragraph 3« 
Balance of Sales price due of $90,500.00 shall be paid as 
follows: 
Assumption by LeRoy Collard of a mart gage loan on 
the above described property in the principal amount 
of $59r958.75 presently" payable by Kagle Construction 
Company to first Security Bank and the balance of 
$30*, 541.26 i s payable by delivery and conveyance to 
se l l er of 55,000 shares of Utah Coal and Chemical Corp. 
Capital stock, lhe stock conveyed to se l l er i s to 
be free of any encumbrances, Hens or restrictions 
on trading. 
Title of said premises shall be delivered to buyer 
when seller has verified marketability of stock, 
conveyed and verified a market .value sufficient 
to cover the unpaid balance. Such time i s to be 
determined by sel ler but wi l l not be unreasonably 
delayed. 
Nagle Construction Company ; 
Witness * Sel ler , , V / 
Buyer" ( / / 
n 
M L 
«4lU 
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Addendua #2 
To Real Estate Contract between Nagle Construction Company and LeRoy 
Collaxd. Dated «• > £2ll L£ *'•• ^?*" CzLZ£L 
Title of premises being sold under the contract referred to above will 
be transferred when Nagle Construction Company s e l l s sufficient of the 
shares of Utah Coal and Checdcal Corp. transferred under addendum #1 
to realize $85,000 cash. Seller hereby agrees to s e l l shares sufficient 
to realize $85*000 within 1 year of receipt thereof providing the 
market value of aaid shares wi l l cause a realization of $85,000. 
Should the value of the 551000 shares conveyed not equal $85,000 within 
l .yeax. buyer agrees to convey additional shares of Utah Coal and 
Chemical Corp. dtocJc or cash suff icient t o bring the total value 
conveyed to se l ler to $85,000.before s e l l e r conveys t i t l e to premises 
eold to buyer. 
. Nagle Construction Company 
Witness ^ ^ Sel ler :"' / / 
Buyer 
M3 
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Norman H. Jackson 
Presiding Judge 
Judith M. Billings 
Associate Presiding Judge 
Russe l l W. B e n c h 
Judge 
J a m e s Z. D a v i s 
Judge 
P a m e l a T. G r e e n w o o d 
Judge 
Gregory K. Orme 
Judge 
Will iam A. T h o m e , Jr. 
Judge 
©taf) Court of Appeals' 
450 South State Street 
P.O. Box 140230 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230 
Appellate Clerks' Office (801) 578-3900 
Judges' Reception (801) 578-3950 
FAX (801)578-3999 
TDD (801) 578-3940 
November 12,2002 
M a r i l y n M. B r a n d 
Appellate Court Administi 
P a u l e t t e S t a g g 
Clerk of the Court 
Ralph J. Marsh 
68 South Main Street, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, UT, 84101 
Kathryn Collard 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 1111 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: ' Collard v. Nagle, Case No. 20000976-CA 
A correction has been made to the Court's Opinion in the above-referenced case, which 
was originally issued on September 26, 2002. The correction is as follows: 
- The last two sentences were removed from Paragraph 26. 
A:copy of the corrected Opinion is enclosed, along with a copy of the Court's Order concerning 
the correction. The issuance date will remain the same. 
We apologize for the confusion and/or inconvenience. 
Very truly yours, 
('. • UJUJixXX>. dj^&tfls 
Paulette Stagg 0 / 
Clerk of the Court 
PSxam 
Enclosure 
cc. Hon. William B. Bohling 
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This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
FILED 
Utah Court of Api 
SEP 2 6 2002 
Paulette Stagj 
Clerk of the Coi 
K a t h r y n C o l l a r d , T r u s t e e of 
t h e LeRoy C o l l a r d T r u s t , 
P l a i n t i f f a n d A p p e l l e e , 
v . 
Nag le C o n s t r u c t i o n , I n c . , a 
Utah c o r p o r a t i o n ; G a r y M. 
N a g l e , a n i n d i v i d u a l ; a n d 
M a r i l y n F . N a g l e , a n 
i n d i v i d u a l , 
D e f e n d a n t s a n d A p p e l l a n t s , 
Gary M. N a g l e , 
C o u n t e r c l a i m P l a i n t i f f , 
v . 
K a t h r y n C o l l a r d , T r u s t e e o f 
t h e LeRoy C o l l a r d T r u s t , 
C o u n t e r c l a i m D e f e n d a n t . 
AMENDED OPINION 
(For O f f i c i a l P u b l i c a t i o n ) 
C a s e No . 2 0 0 0 0 9 7 6 - C A 
F I L E D 
( S e p t e m b e r 2 6 , 2002) 
12 002 UT App 3Q6' 
T h i r d D i s t r i c t , S a l t L a k e D e p a r t m e n t 
The H o n o r a b l e W i l l i a m B . B o h l i n g 
A t t o r n e y s : R a l p h J . M a r s h , S a l t L a k e C i t y , f o r A p p e l l a n t s 
K a t h r y n C o l l a r d , S a l t L a k e C i t y , A p p e l l e e P r o Se 
B e f o r e J u d g e s J a c k s o n , D a v i s , and Orme. 
DAVIS, J u d g e : 
Hi Defendants Nagle Construction, Inc., Gary M. Nagle, and 
Marilyn F. Nagle1 appeal from the trial court's decision to grant 
I. Nagle Construction, Inc. was the original seller in this 
case. It conveyed its interest in the property at issue to Gary 
(cont inuec. . .} 
-tUft 
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summary j u d g m e n t f o r P l a i n t i f f K a t h r y n C o l l a r d , 2 t r u s t e e of t h e 
LeRoy C o l l a r d T r u s t . The t r i a l c o u r t d e n i e d S e l l e r ' s m o t i o n f o r 
summary j u d g m e n t a n d g r a n t e d B u y e r ' s m o t i o n f o r s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t , 
r u l i n g B u y e r w a s e n t i t l e d t o t i t l e i n c e r t a i n r e a l p r o p e r t y . 
Buyer c r o s s - a p p e a l s t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n t o d e n y B u y e r 
a t t o r n e y f e e s p u r s u a n t t o t h e p a r t i e s ' U n i f o r m R e a l E s t a t e 
C o n t r a c t . 
BACKGROUND3 
]2 On M a r c h 3 0 , 1 9 7 8 , Buyer p u r c h a s e d a c o n d o m i n i u m u n i t from 
S e l l e r . U s i n g a U n i f o r m R e a l E s t a t e C o n t r a c t , B u y e r a g r e e d t o 
pay $ 1 0 0 , 5 0 0 . 0 0 f o r t h e condomin ium b y (1) m a k i n g a down payment 
of $ 1 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 ; (2) a s s u m i n g a m o r t g a g e l o a n owed b y S e l l e r t o 
F i r s t S e c u r i t y B a n k i n t h e amount o f $ 5 9 , 9 5 8 . 7 5 ; a n d (3) 
t e n d e r i n g 5 5 , 0 0 0 s h a r e s of s t o c k of t h e U t a h C o a l a n d C h e m i c a l 
jCompany f o r t h e b a l a n c e of t h e p u r c h a s e p r i c e o f $ 3 0 , 5 4 1 . 2 6 . I n 
r e t u r n , S e l l e r a g r e e d t o c o n v e y t i t l e t o t h e c o n d o m i n i u m when . 
S e l l e r v e r i f i e d t h a t t h e v a l u e of t h e s t o c k w a s ' s u f f i c i e n t t o 
c o v e r t h e u n p a i d b a l a n c e of t h e p u r c h a s e p r i c e . 
^|3 B u y e r a n d S e l l e r a l s o a d d r e s s e d a t t o r n e y f e e s i n t h e 
c o n t r a c t : 
The B u y e r a n d S e l l e r e a c h a g r e e t h a t s h o u l d 
t h e y d e f a u l t i n a n y of t h e c o v e n a n t s o r 
a g r e e m e n t s c o n t a i n e d h e r e i n , t h a t t h e 
d e f a u l t i n g p a r t y s h a l l p a y a l l c o s t s a n d 
e x p e n s e s , i n c l u d i n g a r e a s o n a b l e a t t o r n e y ' s 
f e e , w h i c h may a r i s e o r a c c r u e f r o m e n f o r c i n g 
1. ' ( . . . c o n t i n u e d ) 
M. Nagle on A p r i l 12, 1978. We r e f e r t o N a g l e C o n s t r u c t i o n , 
I n c . , Gary M. N a g l e , and Mar i lyn F. Nag le c o l l e c t i v e l y a s S e l l e r . 
We use t h e t h i r d p e r s o n pronoun "he" when r e f e r r i n g t o S e l l e r . 
2 . LeRoy C o l l a r d , Kathryn C o l l a r d ' s f a t h e r , was t h e o r i g i n a l 
buyer i n t h i s c a s e . However, LeRoy C o l l a r d c o n v e y e d h i s i n t e r e s t 
i n the p r o p e r t y t o Kathryn C o l l a r d on J a n u a r y 3 , 1997, and d ied 
on F e b r u a r y 8, 1997. Thus, we r e f e r t o K a t h r y n C o l l a r d and LeRoy 
C o l l a r d c o l l e c t i v e l y a s Buyer. We u s e t h e t h i r d p e r s o n pronoun 
"she" when r e f e r r i n g t o Buyer. 
3 . I t i s w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t " i n r e v i e w i n g a g r a n t of summary 
judgment, we v i e w t h e f a c t s and a l l r e a s o n a b l e i n f e r e n c e s drawn 
the re f rom i n t h e l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e t o t h e nonmoving p a r t y . " 
Hlogins v . S a l t Lake County, 855 P .2d 2 3 1 , 233 (Utah 1993) . We 
r e c i t e t h e f a c t s of t h i s c a s e a c c o r d i n g l y . 
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this agreement, or in obtaining possession of 
the premises covered hereby, or in pursuing 
any remedy provided hereunder or by the 
statutes of the State of Utah whether such 
remedy is pursued by filing a suit or 
otherwise. 
. 1|4 Buyer paid the $10,000.00 down payment and began making 
payments on the mortgage. She also took possession of the 
condominium, began paying property taxes, and began making 
improvements to the property. In May 1979, Buyer recorded notice 
of the contract and tendered the required 55,000 shares of stock 
to Seller. However, Buyer never assumed the mortgage. 
%5 Seller informed Buyer that he considered Buyer's failure to 
assume the mortgage a breach of contract and advised Buyer that 
default and foreclosure proceedings could be instituted. In lieu 
of foreclosure proceedings, Buyer and Seller added a second 
addendum4 to the contract on September 18, 1979. In Addendum 2, 
Buyer agreed to pay approximately $50,000.00 more for the 
condominium in exchange for Seller's forbearance. Addendum 2 
reads: 
Title of premises being sold under the 
' contract referred to above will be 
transferred when [Seller] sells sufficient of 
the shares of Utah Coal and Chemical Corp. 
transferred under [the contract] to realize 
$85,000 cash. Seller hereby agrees to sell 
shares sufficient to realize $85,000 within 1 
year of receipt thereof providing the market 
value of said shares will cause a realization 
of $85,000. 
Should the value of the 55,000 shares 
conveyed not equal $85,000 within 1 year 
buyer agrees to convey additional shares of 
Utah Coal and Chemical Corp. stock or cash 
sufficient to bring the total value conveyed 
to seller to $85,000 before seller conveys 
title to premises sold to buyer. 
<J6 On January 13, 1981, Seller, through his attorney, sent 
Buyer a letter informing Buyer that the stocks did not reach the 
contracted value of $85,000.00 within one year and that Buyer had 
4. The parties drafted Addendum 1 as part of the original 
contract. Therefore, we make no separate reference to Addendum 
1 . 
2C000976-CA 
ou/ai 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
not ye t p a i d t h e d i f f e r e n c e . A c c o r d i n g l y , S e l l e r in fo rmed Buyer 
t h a t he would c o n s i d e r Buyer in d e f a u l t i f Buye r d i d not pay the 
amount s t i l l owed on t h e c o n t r a c t by J a n u a r y 2 5 , 1 9 8 1 . 
%1 Buyer r e s p o n d e d t o t h e l e t t e r on J a n u a r y 2 5 , 1 9 8 1 , by 
a s s e r t i n g t h a t s h e was n o t i n d e f a u l t and by e n c l o s i n g 
i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t a l l e g e d l y d e m o n s t r a t e d t h e s t o c k s cou ld have 
been s o l d f o r $ 3 5 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 d u r i n g t h e o n e - y e a r p e r i o d r e f e r r e d to 
in Addendum 2 . A f t e r B u y e r ' s r e s p o n s e , no f u r t h e r a c t i o n 
conce rn ing t h e c o n t r a c t was t aken by e i t h e r p a r t y u n t i l 1999. 
During t h i s t i m e , Buyer c o n t i n u e d t o i n h a b i t t h e condominium and 
make mor tgage , t a x , and improvement p a y m e n t s . I n 1986, Buyer 
sought t o r e f i n a n c e t h e mortgage on t h e condomin ium, and r e c e i v e d 
a r e s p o n s e l e t t e r i n f o r m i n g h e r t h a t t i t l e t o t h e condominium was 
in S e l l e r ' s name. L a t e r , i n 1989, Buyer w r o t e a l e t t e r 
s p e c i f i c a l l y r e q u e s t i n g t h a t S e l l e r ' s name b e r e p l a c e d w i t h 
Buye r ' s name on t h e t i t l e . 
1|8 On J u l y 2 8 , 1999, Buyer b rough t s u i t , s e e k i n g a d e c l a r a t o r y 
judgment t o q u i e t t i t l e based on b r e a c h of c o n t r a c t and adve r se 
p o s s e s s i o n . S e l l e r answered and c o u n t e r c l a i m e d f o r r emed ies 
under t h e c o n t r a c t , i n c l u d i n g f o r f e i t u r e a n d f o r e c l o s u r e . S e l l e r 
a l s o sought a d e c l a r a t o r y judgment q u i e t i n g t i t l e i n him. Both 
p a r t i e s f i l e d m o t i o n s f o r summary j u d g m e n t . A f t e r a J u l y 17, 
2000 h e a r i n g , t h e t r i a l c o u r t r u l e d t h a t t h e s t a t u t e of 
l i m i t a t i o n s b a r r e d b o t h p a r t i e s ' c l a i m s , and o r d e r e d a h e a r i n g t o 
de t e rmine w h e t h e r t h e c o u r t had e q u i t a b l e p o w e r s t o r e s o l v e the 
d i s p u t e . 
[^9 During t h a t h e a r i n g , on August 30, 2 0 0 0 , t h e t r i a l c o u r t 
r u l e d t h a t o n l y S e l l e r was b a r r e d by t h e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s . 
The t r i a l c o u r t d e t e r m i n e d t h a t t h e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s ran 
a g a i n s t S e l l e r when he f a i l e d t o b r i n g s u i t a g a i n s t Buyer w i t h i n 
s i x y e a r s a f t e r Buyer a l l e g e d l y f a i l e d t o p a y t h e $ 8 5 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
r e q u i r e d by Addendum 2 . However, t h e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s had 
not run a g a i n s t Buyer b e c a u s e h e r c o n t i n u o u s m o r t g a g e payments 
had kept and would c o n t i n u e t o keep t h e r e m a i n d e r of the c o n t r a c t 
a l i v e . A c c o r d i n g l y , t h e t r i a l c o u r t r u l e d t h a t B u y e r ' s l e g a l 
r i g h t t o t i t l e would a c c r u e when she f i n i s h e d p a y i n g the 
mor tgage . 
H10 In i t s December 4 , 2000 w r i t t e n o r d e r , t h e t r i a l c o u r t 
l i s t e d t h e u n d i s p u t e d f a c t s of t he c a s e . Among t h e s e f a c t s , the 
t r i a l c o u r t s p e c i f i c a l l y s t a t e d : "The c o u r t makes no f i n d i n g 
r e g a r d i n g t h e v a l u e of t h e 55,000 s h a r e s of S t o c k r e c e i v e d by 
( S e l l e r ] a t any p o i n t i n t i m e " ; " [N]o a d d i t i o n a l a g r e e m e n t s or 
changes t o t h e c o n t r a c t were e n t e r e d i n t o b e t w e e n ( S e l l e r anc 
Buyer] a f t e r J a n u a r y 2 5 , 1981" ; and S e l l e r " r e t a i n e d the 55,000 
s h a r e s of S t o c k and t h e $10 ,000 .00 down payment made by [Buyer] ." 
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Ull Based on the undisputed facts, the trial court concluded 
that the contract was governed by the six-year statute of 
limitations as set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23 (1996); 
that Seller's cause of action for breach of contract based on 
Buyer's failure to assume the mortgage arose no later than 
January 25, 1981; that Seller's counterclaim based on Addendum 2 
and the value of the 55,000 shares of stock was barred no lacer 
than January 25, 1987; and that Seller's continued acquiescence 
in Buyer's payments on the mortgage balance operated as a waiver 
of the assumption requirement. The court also concluded that 
"[e]ach and every cause of action set forth in [Seller's] Answer 
and Counterclaim was and is barred by the six year Statute of 
Limitations set forth in [section] 78-12-23." 
1|l2 The court went on to find that: "Except for the terms or 
requirements of the contract, the enforcement of which is now 
barred by the statute of limitations . . . the Contract remains a 
valid and binding agreement.between the parties"; "The [Buyer's] 
right to demand delivery of fee title pursuant to the Contract 
has not arisen and will not arise or accrue until payment of the 
remaining balance owing on the [mortgage]"; and finally, 
"Pursuant to the terms of the Contract, [Buyer] is entitled to 
immediate delivery of fee title subject to and conditioned upon 
payment of the remaining balance owed on the [mortgage] . " 
Hl3 The court then fashioned an order that denied Seller's 
motion for summary judgment, denied Buyer's cross-motion for 
summary judgment on her breach of contract and adverse possession 
claims, awarded summary judgment for Buyer on Seller's 
counterclaims, and gramted Buyer's cross-motion for summary 
judgment for "Declaratory Relief-Quiet Title." The court ordered 
delivery of the deed to an escrow agent of Buyer's choosing, 
ordered Buyer to pay off the mortgage, and ordered the deed 
released to Buyer once the mortgage was paid. On November 6, 
2000, the Court rejected Buyer's request for attorney fees and 
costs. 
Ja4 On December 4, 2000, the trial court entered an order 
staying judgment on appeal conditioned upon Seller's posting 
bond. Seller failed to post bond, and the Court vacated the 
ordered stay. Title to the condominium passed to Buyer when she 
finished making the mortgage payments. Thereafter, the 
condominium was sold to a third party. 
20000976-CA D 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW-
Hl5 The f i r s t i s s u e o n a p p e a l i s w h e t h e r t h e t r i a l c o u r t 
c o r r e c t l y g r a n t e d B u y e r ' s m o t i o n f o r summary j u d g m e n t , r u l i n g 
t h a t B u y e r w a s e n t i t l e d t o t i t l e of t h e p r o p e r t y . "Summary 
j u d g m e n t i s a p p r o p r i a t e o n l y when no g e n u i n e i s s u e s o f m a t e r i a l 
f a c t e x i s t a n d t h e m o v i n g p a r t y i s e n t i t l e d t o j u d g m e n t a s a 
m a t t e r of l a w . " J o n e s v . ERA B r o k e r s C o n s o l , , 2 0 0 0 UT 6 1 , 1 a , 6 
P . 3 d 1129 ; s e e a l s o U t a h R. C i v . P . 5 6 ( c ) . " B e c a u s e e n t i t l e m e n t 
t o summary j u d g m e n t i s a q u e s t i o n of l a w , we a c c o r d n o d e f e r e n c e 
t o t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s r e s o l u t i o n of t h e l e g a l i s s u e s p r e s e n t e d . " 
K & T, I n c . v . K o r o u l i s , 888 P . 2 d 6 2 3 , 627 ( U t a h 1 9 9 4 ) . "We 
d e t e r m i n e o n l y w h e t h e r t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d i n a p p l y i n g t h e 
g o v e r n i n g l a w a n d w h e t h e r t h e t r i a l c o u r t c o r r e c t l y h e l d t h a t 
t h e r e w e r e n o d i s p u t e d i s s u e s o f m a t e r i a l f a c t . " B e r e n d a v . 
L a n g f o r d , 914 P . 2 d 4 5 , 50 (Utah 1996) ( c i t a t i o n s a n d q u o t a t i o n s 
o m i t t e d ) . 
1 l 6 The s e c o n d i s s u e o n a p p e a l i s w h e t h e r t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d 
i n d e n y i n g B u y e r a t t o r n e y f e e s . " W h e t h e r a p a r t y may r e c o v e r 
a t t o r n e y f e e s i n a n a c t i o n i s a q u e s t i o n o f l a w t h a t we r e v i e w 
f o r c o r r e c t n e s s . " A u l t v . H o l d e n , 2002 UT 3 3 , 1 1 4 6 , 44 P . 3 d 7 8 1 . 
ANALYSIS 
I . Summary J u d g m e n t a n d S p e c i f i c P e r f o r m a n c e 
\ll S e l l e r a r g u e s t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d i n g r a n t i n g B u y e r ' s 
m o t i o n f o r summary j u d g m e n t b e c a u s e B u y e r w a s n o t e n t i t l e d t o 
r e c e i v e t i t l e t o t h e c o n d o m i n i u m w i t h o u t f i r s t p a y i n g t h e f u l l 
p u r c h a s e p r i c e . 
JIl8 A l t h o u g h t h e t r i a l c o u r t c h a r a c t e r i z e d i t s d e c i s i o n a s an 
o r d e r t o q u i e t t i t l e , t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n i s a c t u a l l y a 
d e c r e e f o r s p e c i f i c p e r f o r m a n c e . A q u i e t t i t l e a c t i o n i s a 
" p r o c e e d i n g t o e s t a b l i s h a p l a i n t i f f ' s t i t l e t o l a n d . " B l a c k ' s 
Law D i c t i o n a r y 30 ( 7 t h e d . 1 9 9 9 ) ; s e e a l s o U t a h C o d e Ann. § 78 -
5. S e l l e r a l s o a r g u e s t h a t B u y e r d i d n o t m e e t t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s 
of r u l e 9 ( h ) o f t h e U t a h R u l e s o f C i v i l P r o c e d u r e w h e n s h e 
p l e a d e d t h e a f f i r m a t i v e d e f e n s e of s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s b e c a u s e 
s h e d i d n o t " r e f e r [] t o o r d e s c r i b [ e ] s u c h s t a t u t e s p e c i f i c a l l y 
and d e f i n i t e l y b y s e c t i o n n u m b e r . " We d e c l i n e t o r e a c h t h i s 
a rgumen t a s i t i s r a i s e d f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e o n a p p e a l . S e e , 
e . g . , Monson v . C a r v e r , 928 P . 2 d 1017 , 1022 ( U t a h 19S6) ( h o l d i n g 
" ' i s s u e s n o t r a i s e d a t t r i a l c a n n o t b e a r g u e d f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e 
b n a p p e a l ' . . . u n l e s s t h e p e t i t i o n e r d e m o n s t r a t e s t h a t ' p l a i n 
e r r o r ' o c c u r r e d o r ' e x c e p t i o n a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s ' e x i s t " ) ( q u o t i n g 
S t a t e v . L o p e z , 886 P . 2 d 1105 , 1113 ( U t a h 1 9 9 4 ) ) . 
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40-1 ( 1 9 9 6 ) . "To s u c c e e d i n an a c t i o n t o q u i e t t i t l e t o r e a l 
e s t a t e , a p l a i n t i f f must p r e v a i l on t h e s t r e n g t h of h i s own c l a im 
t o t i t l e and not on t h e weakness of a d e f e n d a n t ' s t i t l e o r even 
i t s t o t a l l a c k of t i t l e . " Church v. Meadow S p r i n g s Ranch Corp . , 
659 P.2d 1045 , 1048-49 (Utah 1983) . C o n v e r s e l y , an a c t i o n for 
s p e c i f i c p e r f o r m a n c e i s an a c t i o n s e e k i n g " p r e c i s e f u l f i l l m e n t of 
a l e g a l o r c o n t r a c t u a l o b l i g a t i o n . " B l a c k ' s Law D i c t i o n a r y 1407 
(7 th ed . 1 9 9 9 ) ; s e e a l s o K e l l e y v . L e u c a d i a F i n . C o r p . , 84 6 P. 2d 
1:238, 1243 (Utah 1 9 9 2 ) . In t h i s c a s e , S e l l e r , n o t Buye r , he ld 
t i t l e t o t h e condominium and t h e t r i a l c o u r t d e t e r m i n e d t h a t 
Buyer was n o t i n a d v e r s e p o s s e s s i o n . C o n s e q u e n t l y , B u y e r ' s on ly 
c la im t o t i t l e of t h e condominium was t h r o u g h s p e c i f i c 
per formance of t h e c o n t r a c t . Un less t h e t r i a l c o u r t o r d e r e d 
S e l l e r t o p e r f o r m , Buyer had no c l a i m t o l e g a l t i t l e of t he 
condominium. See O lwe l l v . C l a rk , 658 P . 2 d 5 8 5 , 5 8 6 - 8 7 (Utah 
,1982) ( r e c o g n i z i n g t h a t under t h e a d v e r s e p o s s e s s i o n s t a t u t e 
" p o s s e s s i o n of r e a l p r o p e r t y i s presumed t o b e i n t h e l e g a l t i t l e 
ho lde r and t h a t occupancy by any o t h e r i s . deemed s u b o r d i n a t e to 
t h a t t i t l e " ( emphas i s i n o r i g i n a l ) ) . T h e r e f o r e , t h e t r i a l 
c o u r t ' s o r d e r i n B u y e r ' s f avor i s an o r d e r g r a n t i n g s p e c i f i c 
pe r fo rmance . 
;1|l9 S p e c i f i c p e r f o r m a n c e i s an e q u i t a b l e r e m e d y . See F i s c h e r v. 
Johnson, 525 P .2d 4 5 , 46 (Utah 1974) . "To o b t a i n a d e c r e e for 
s p e c i f i c p e r f o r m a n c e a g a i n s t a d e f a u l t i n g p a r t y , t h e a g g r i e v e d 
p a r t y must make an u n c o n d i t i o n a l t e n d e r of t h e p e r f o r m a n c e 
r e q u i r e d by t h e a g r e e m e n t . " Ke l l ey , 846 P . 2 d a t 1243 (emphasis 
added) . " N e i t h e r p a r t y t o an agreement ' c a n b e s a i d t o be in 
d e f a u l t (and t h u s s u s c e p t i b l e t o a j udgme n t f o r damages o r a 
dec ree f o r s p e c i f i c per formance) u n t i l t h e o t h e r p a r t y has 
t e n d e r e d h i s own p e r f o r m a n c e . ' " I d . ( q u o t i n g C e n t u r y 21 Al l W, 
Real E s t a t e & I n v . , I n c . v . Webb, 645 P . 2 d 5 2 , 56 (Utah 1 9 8 2 ) ) . 
Thus., t o be e n t i t l e d t o t h e e q u i t a b l e remedy o f s p e c i f i c 
per formance on t h e c o n t r a c t , Buyer must h a v e f u l l y t e n d e r e d , or 
•stood r e a d y t o f u l l y t e n d e r , h e r own p e r f o r m a n c e u n d e r t h e 
c o n t r a c t . 
1|20 Under t h e t e r m s of t h e c o n t r a c t , Buyer was r e q u i r e d t o 
perform t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s o u t l i n e d i n t h e c o n t r a c t b e f o r e 
r e c e i v i n g t i t l e t o the . condominium. Buyer made t h e $ 1 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
down payment i n 1978 and t e n d e r e d t h e 5 5 , 0 0 0 s h a r e s of s t o c k in 
1979. However, Buyer f a i l e d t o assume t h e m o r t g a g e . In r e s p o n s e 
to B u y e r ' s b r e a c h , S e l l e r and Buyer added Addendum 2 t o t h e 
c o n t r a c t . Under Addendum 2, Buyer was o b l i g a t e d t o pay an 
a d d i t i o n a l $ 5 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 , b r i n g i n g t h e t o t a l t o $ 8 5 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 . Th i s 
$85 ,000 .00 was t o be r e a l i z e d from t h e 5 5 , 0 0 0 s h a r e s of s t o c k she 
had a l r e a d y t e n d e r e d t o S e l l e r . In Addendum 2 , S e l l e r ag reed co 
s e l l t h e s t o c k w i t h i n one y e a r i f i t r e a c h e d a v a l u e of ac l e a s t 
$85 ,000 .00 w i t h i n t h a t y e a r . O t h e r w i s e , B u y e r was o b l i g a t e d t o 
"convey a d d i t i o n a l s h a r e s of Utah Coal and C h e m i c a l Corp . stocK 
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or cash sufficient to bring the total value conveyed to seller to 
$85,000 before seller conveys title to premises sold to buyer." 
^21 Summary judgment is inappropriate because whether Buyer ever 
performed the requirements of Addendum 2 is a disputed issue of 
fact. Although Buyer conveyed the 55,000 shares of stock, there 
is evidence in the record presented by Seller to show that the 
shares never reached a value of at least $85,000.00. In 
contrast, Buyer submitted evidence that the shares did obtain a 
value of at least $85,000.00 within the one-year period specified 
in Addendum 2. The trial court seemed to recognize this 
conflict, but expressly noted that it made no finding7 as to the 
value of the 55,000 shares of stock at any time. If the stock 
did reach a value of at least $85,000.00 within one year and 
Buyer assumed the mortgage, then Buyer fully performed and is 
entitled to specific performance. However, if the stock did not 
reach a value of $85,000.00 within one year and Buyer never 
tendered stock or cash sufficient to bring the total value 
conveyed to $85,000.00, then Buyer never fully performed and is 
not entitled to specific performance. 
|^22 Buyer argues that the statute of limitations prevents Seller 
from asserting Buyer's failure to assume the mortgage and failure 
to pay the amount due under Addendum 2 as counterclaims. In this 
case, the trial court held Seller's claims for breach of contract 
accrued no later than January 25, 1981. Nevertheless, even if 
6. We note that the trial court incorrectly interpreted the 
language of Addendum 2. "'In interpreting a contract, the 
intentions of the parties are controlling.' " Spears v. Warr, 
2002 UT 24,H39, 44 P.3d 742 (quoting Central Fla . Invs., Inc. v. 
Parkwest Assocs., 2002 UT 3,^12, 40 P.3d 599). "When presented 
with a written instrument, we look first to the four corners of 
the agreement to determine the parties' intentions. If the 
language within the four corners is unambiguous, the parties' 
intentions are determined from the plain meaning of the 
contractual language." Id. (internal citation omitted). The 
language of Addendum 2 is unambiguous. Buyer was obligated to 
transfer $85,000.00 in value before Seller conveyed title. 
However, the parties and the trial court misinterpreted the 
language of Addendum 2 to mean Buyer was required to pay the 
total $85,000.00 within one year. The one-year time limitation 
to which the trial court refers relates not to Buyer's obligation 
to pay, but to Seller's obligation to sell the stock if the stock 
reached a value of at least $85,000.00 within one year. 
7. Since findings in a summary judgment context are 
inappropriate anyway, the court presumably determined it was 
unnecessary to reach this issue given its conclusion that 
Seller's claims were barred by the statute of limitations. 
20000976-CA 3 
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S e l l e r ' s c o u n t e r c l a i m s a r e b a r r e d by t h e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s , 
S e l l e r i s p e r m i t t e d t o use t h e s e c o u n t e r c l a i m s a s an o f f s e t or 
recoupment a g a i n s t B u y e r ' s c l a i m s . 
|^23 O f f s e t i s p e r m i t t e d when ucross demands h a v e e x i s t e d between 
p e r s o n s u n d e r s u c h c i r c u m s t a n c e s t h a t , i f one had b r o u g h t an 
a c t i o n a g a i n s t t h e o t h e r , a c o u n t e r c l a i m c o u l d h a v e been s e t u p . " 
Utah R. C i v . P . 13 ( i ) . When o f f s e t i s u t i l i z e d , " t h e two demands 
s h a l l be deemed compensa t ed so f a r as t h e y e q u a l e a c h o t h e r . " 
Id . Under t h i s d o c t r i n e , a de fendan t may even " u t i l i z e a 
c o u n t e r c l a i m , n o r m a l l y b a r r e d by t h e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s , t o 
o f f s e t a p l a i n t i f f ' s c l a i m . " Coulon v . C o u l o n , 915 P .2d 1069, 
1072 (Utah C t . App. 1 9 9 6 ) . Recoupment i s s i m i l a r t o o f f s e t and 
i s u t i l i z e d whe re p a r t i e s ' c l a i m s a r i s e from t h e same 
t r a n s a c t i o n . See Mark VII F i n . C o n s u l t a n t s C o r p . v . Smedley, 7 92 
P.2d 130, 1 3 2 - 3 3 (Utah C t . App. 1990) ( h o l d i n g t h a t a l t h o u g h 
o f f s e t " r e f e r s t o an u n r e l a t e d t r a n s a c t i o n " a n d r ecoupmen t r e f e r s 
to " t h e same t r a n s a c t i o n , " " t h e d i s t i n c t i o n s b e t w e e n recoupment , 
{ o f f s e t ] , and c o u n t e r c l a i m have . . . b e e n d i s s o l v e d i n U t a h " ) . 
1|24 In t h i s c a s e , e i t h e r o f f s e t o r r ecoupmen t i s p e r m i t t e d . 
F i r s t , o f f s e t i s p e r m i t t e d because B u y e r ' s and S e l l e r ' s c a u s e s of 
a c t i o n c o e x i s t e d . "An a c t i o n may be b r o u g h t by any p e r s o n 
a g a i n s t a n o t h e r who c l a i m s an e s t a t e o r i n t e r e s t i n r e a l p r o p e r t y 
or an i n t e r e s t o r iClaim to. p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y a d v e r s e t o him, for 
the p u r p o s e of d e t e r m i n i n g such a d v e r s e c l a i m . " U tah Code Ann. 
§ 7 8 - 4 0 - 1 . Buye r b r o u g h t h e r a c t i o n a g a i n s t S e l l e r i n 1999. 
Buyer a r g u e s t h a t she had t o wa i t t o b r i n g s u i t u n t i l a f t e r she 
pa id t h e r e m a i n i n g amount owed on t h e m o r t g a g e . However, t h i s 
c o n t e n t i o n i s c o n t r a d i c t e d by B u y e r ' s own c o u r s e of c o n d u c t . 
This a c t i o n was b r o u g h t b e f o r e Buyer f i n i s h e d p a y i n g t h e b a l a n c e 
pt t h e m o r t g a g e . . Thus , because S e l l e r ' s and B u y e r ' s c l a i m s 
c o e x i s t e d , S e l l e r i s e n t i t l e d t o use h i s c o u n t e r c l a i m s t o o f f s e t 
B u y e r ' s c l a i m s . Second, recoupment i s p e r m i t t e d b e c a u s e S e l l e r ' s 
and B u y e r ' s c l a i m s a r o s e from t h e same c o n t r a c t . 
f25 Buyer a r g u e s t h a t o f f s e t i s not a v a i l a b l e t o S e l l e r because 
S e l l e r d i d n o t p l e a d o f f s e t a s an a f f i r m a t i v e d e f e n s e a s r e q u i r e d 
by r u l e 12(h) of t h e Utah Rules of C i v i l P r o c e d u r e . However, 
n e i t h e r o f f s e t n o r recoupment a r e a f f i r m a t i v e d e f e n s e s t h a t must 
be p l e a d e d o r w a i v e d . I n s t e a d , o f f s e t and r e c o u p m e n t a r e merely 
mechanisms t h a t may be used t o e n s u r e s u b s t a n t i a l j u s t i c e if a 
p a r t y a s s e r t s a c o u n t e r c l a i m t h a t i s b a r r e d by t h e s t a t u t e of 
l i m i t a t i o n s . S e e , e . g . , J a c o b s e n v. Bunker , 699 P . 2 d 1208, 1210 
(Utah 1985) ( h o l d i n g t h a t where a d e f e n d a n t h a s "a c o u n t e r c l a i m 
t h a t o t h e r w i s e would have been b a r r e d by a s t a t u t e of 
l i m i t a t i o n s , t h e c o u n t e r c l a i m could be ( o f f s e t ] a g a i n s t t h e 
p l a i n t i f f ' s c l a i m " ) . 
^26 Al lowing an o f f s e t o r recoupment i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s where a 
d e f e n d a n t ' s a f f i r m a t i v e c l a ims a r e b a r r e d by t h e s t a t u t e of 
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limitations is based on a sound policy of preventing a plaintiff 
from waiting to assert a claim until after a defendant's 
counterclaim is barred. See Coulon, 915 P.2d at 1072. Allowing 
an offset in this case is appropriate even though Buyer 
essentially seeks specific performance rather than money damages 
because equity requires it. To the extent that Seller sat on his 
rights and delayed asserting those rights, Buyer did the same. 
Moreover, although Seller may have ultimately waived his claim, 
it is Buyer who initially breached the parties' original contract 
by never assuming the mortgage. To allow Buyer to breach one of 
her obligations under the contract, then, years later--after 
never having brought suit to have title conveyed--to obtain title 
without having to perform her other obligations under the same 
contract, is not equitable. 
127 If, on remand, the fact finder determines that the 55,000 
shares were worth at least $85,000.00 at some point in time 
between September 18, 19798 and September 18, 1980, and that 
Sfeller was obligated to sell the shares at that time, then Buyer 
has performed her obligations and Seller is not entitled to 
further relief. However, if the fact finder determines that the 
shares did not reach a value of $85,000.00 within the appointed 
period, then Seller is entitled to offset the amount of the 
shortfall Buyer was obligated to pay in cash or additional shares 
against the value of the property. 
H28 We reject Buyer's other arguments for affirming the trial 
court's order. First, Buyer argues the trial court's decision 
granting specific performance was correct because Seller waived 
his right to sue for breach of contract. Regardless of any 
implied waiver by Seller as to Buyer's duty to assume the 
mortgage, the above analysis, based on equity and the propriety 
of an offset for Seller, controls. Second, Buyer argues that the 
trial court's decision was appropriate because the doctrine of 
laches prevents Seller from asserting his rights under the 
contract. Laches bars a recovery when there has been a delay by-
one party causing a disadvantage to the other party. See 
Papanikolas Bros. Enters, v. Suqarhouse Shopping Ctr. Assocs., 
535 P.2d 1256, 1260 (Utah 1975). Whether laches bars recovery in 
this case turns on disputed issues of fact, making it 
inappropriate for summary judgment. 
II. Attorney Fees 
^29 The language of the contract respecting attorney fees is 
unambiguous. The parties intended that the defaulting party 
should be responsible for costs and attorney fees. Accordingly, 
8. The date of execution of Addendum 2. 
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on remand t h e t r i a l c o u r t s h o u l d d e t e r m i n e a n d a w a r d c o s t s and 
a t t o r n e y f e e s a s may now b e a p p r o p r i a t e . 
CONCLUSION 
1|30 We c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d i n g r a n t i n g summary 
j u d g m e n t f o r B u y e r a n d o r d e r i n g t i t l e b e c o n v e y e d t o B u y e r upon 
payment , o f t h e m o r t g a g e . We a l s o c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e o n l y b a s i s 
f o r a w a r d i n g a t t o r n e y f e e s i s t h e c o n t r a c t , a n d l e a v e t o t h e 
t r i a l c o u r t o n r e m a n d t o d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r a n d t o whom a t t o r n e y 
f e ^ e r ~ a f i a c c o s t s s h o u l d b e a w a r d e d . 
Norman-H. J a c k s o 1 
P r e s i d i n g J u d g e 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
• < 
KATHRYN COLLARD, TRUSTEE of the 
LeRoy Collard Trust, 
Plaintiff, 
vs, 
NAGLE CONSTRUCTION, INC., a 
Utah corporation; GARY M. NAGLE 
and MARILYN F. NAGLE, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 990907648 
Honorable BRUCE C. LUBECKj 
DATE: June 10, 2005 
Ui 
> 
> 
m 
The above matter came before the court for a bench trial on 
June 7 and 8, 2005. Plaintiff was present through Kathryn 
Collard, Trustee and counsel, and Defendants were present with 
Sean N. Egan. 
BACKGROUND 
This case has considerable background. 
The formal case began with a complaint filed July 28, 1999, 
but most relevant events were two decades before that, in 1978-
1980. The complaint sought to quiet title to a condominium unit 
on Quail Hollow Drive. It alleged on March 30, 1978, some twenty 
years previous, LeRoy Collard and Nagle Construction signed a 
Uniform Real Estate Contract and Collard took possession of the 
property immediately, and made mortgage payments to First 
Security Bank. The price was to be $100,500. Addendum I was 
executed actually as part of the contract and it required Collard 
to assume the mortgage in favor of First'Security in the sum of 
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approximately $60,000, and the balance (approximately $30,000) 
was to be paid by Collard by a tender of 55,000 shares of stock 
of Utah Coal and Chemical to Nagel Construction. The complaint 
alleged Collard tendered that stock and in April, 1978, the 
Nagles executed a deed of trust in favor of First Security in the 
principal amount of approximately $60,000, which deed was 
recorded. A Notice of Contract was recorded by Collard May 18, 
1979. The contract stated defendants agreed to transfer title to 
Collard upon sale of the stock. In January 1981, counsel for 
defendants wrote a letter to Collard which alleged a breach by 
Collard, but which acknowledged receipt of the stock. On January 
3, 1997, Collard transferred by warranty deed the property to 
plaintiff as trustee. Collard died February 8, 1997. 
Plaintiff alleged a cause of action for breach of contract 
in that defendants did not tender fee title to Collard. A second 
cause alleged adverse possession, that Collard or his assigns had 
been in open and notorious possession for over 20 years and paid 
taxes. The third cause of action sought declaratory judgment and 
quiet title, that the trust is the owner in fee simple, subject 
only to the interest of First Security Bank. 
On September 30, 1999, the Nagles filed an answer and 
counterclaim. That counterclaim alleged the contract, the Uniform 
Real Estate Contract, was an installment land sale contract, 
-2-
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whereby Collard agreed to possess the property while Nagle 
Construction retained legal title as security for its rights. It 
alleged $10,000 was paid at closing, and the remainder, under 
Addendum I, was to be paid as above stated, by assumption of a 
mortgage and tender of stock by Collard. Defendants allege the 
stock sale would not realize $30,000, but Collard prevailed on 
defendants to forebear claiming the price of the stock would go 
up, and as a result Addendum 2 was entered into. That addendum 
indicated that title would pass when Nagle sold shares sufficient 
to realize $85,000, and if the shares did not equal that amount 
within one year, Collard was to convey additional shares or cash 
sufficient to bring the total to $85,000 before Nagle conveyed 
title to Collard. The counterclaim alleged the value of the stock 
never reached $85,000. Collard never tendered cash or additional 
shares of stock. Nagel never sought his default remedies 
believing he could exercise them at any time or that the value of 
the stock would rise. The contract left Nagle with three options 
of forfeiture, suit, or to declare the unpaid balance due and 
treat the contract as a note and mortgage. The counterclaim 
alleged three causes: (1) forfeiture, (2) foreclosure, and (3) 
quiet title. 
On October 12, 1999, plaintiff filed a reply to the 
counterclaim. 
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On October 19, 1999, Nagle Construction filed an answer but 
no counterclaim. 
Motions and cross motions for summary judgment were filed by 
the parties. 
In an order dated November 6, 2000, the court, the 
Honorable William B. Bohling, found as undisputed facts that 
Collard tendered the down payment under the contract, and began 
making payments on the First Security obligation but did not 
refinance the loan in his own name or otherwise remove defendants 
from the First Security obligation, and that Collard took 
possession and later recorded a notice of Contract May 18, 1979. 
The order provided that the failure to assume the obligation was 
a breach of the contract by Collard, but other than write a 
letter Nagel did nothing to act on that default. Nagle retained 
the stock and down payment and Collard and his heirs continued to 
make payments, reducing the principal to approximately $30,000 as 
of the date of the court's order. The court ruled the contract 
was binding, but subject to the statute of limitations of six 
years. The court ruled the counterclaims were all barred by that 
limitation on actions. Further, Nagle's conduct was a waiver of 
any remedies. Because Nagle did not elect any remedies and the 
letter was not sufficient to demand forfeiture, and because of 
the continued acceptance of the tendered performance, the court 
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ruled forfeiture was waived. The court ruled the contract 
remained a valid agreement, but the enforcement was barred by the 
statute of limitation. The right of Collard to demand delivery of 
fee title was ruled not to arise until the First Security 
obligation was paid. The court granted plaintiffs cross motion 
for summary judgment on the quiet title cause of action and 
ordered defendants to deliver to an escrow agent a special 
warranty deed granting the property to plaintiff. Plaintiff was 
to tender all funds needed to pay off the First Security 
obligation. A Title company was then to issue a title policy. 
The district court also denied Collard's motion for cross summary 
judgment on the breach of contract and adverse possession causes 
of action. 
The court granted a stay of enforcement on December 4, 2000, 
upon the posting of a supersedeas bond by defendant. That bond 
was not posted and on December 21, 2004, the court vacated the 
stay and required the title company to release the deed to 
plaintiff for recording in connection with the payoff of the 
First Security obligation. That was all accomplished. 
Defendants appealed that ruling. Plaintiff filed a cross 
appeal of the order denying attorney fees to plaintiff. 
-5-
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On November 21, 2000, Nagle filed a lis pendens on the 
property and conveyed by special warranty deed the property to 
plaintiff. 
The Utah Court of Appeals heard the appeals and on September 
26, 2002, filed an opinion and in November an amended opinion. 
Collard v. Nagle, 51 P.3d 603 (UT App 2002). 
The Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court's decision 
was actually a decree for specific performance, an equitable 
remedy. For such a remedy, Collard must have fully tendered, or 
stood ready to fully tender, his own performance under the 
contract. The Court of Appeals ruled summary judgment was 
inappropriate because there was a dispute about whether Collard 
performed the requirements of Addendum 2. The evidence before 
the court at that time was that Nagle said the value of the stock 
never reached $85,000 and Collard said it did. If the value did 
reach $85,000 within the year as set forth in Addendum 2, then 
Collard would have fully performed and been entitled to specific 
performance. If the value did not reach that level, Collard 
would not have fully performed. 
The Court of Appeals also discussed equitable remedies of 
offset and recoupment and indicated offset is permitted when 
cross demands have existed under circumstances that if one had 
brought an action, a counterclaim could have been set up. Even 
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if barred by a limitations statute, an offset may be permissible. 
Recoupment is similar and is utilized where the claims arise from 
the same transaction. They are both concepts used to assure 
substantial justice is done. 
The Court of Appeals remanded the matter and stated that if 
the fact finder determines that the 55,000 shares were worth at 
least $85,000 at some point between September 18, 1979, and 
September 18, 1980, and that Nagle was obligated to sell the 
shares at that time, then Collard has performed fully and Nagle 
is entitled to no further relief. If the value did not reach 
$85,000 within that time period, Nagle is entitled to offset the 
amount of the shortfall Collard was obligated to pay in cash or 
additional shares. 
As to attorney fees, the Court of Appeals held the contract 
was clear and remanded the matter to the district court to 
determine under the contract those fees as appropriate. 
After that ruling, the case again has taken on a new life, 
despite what appears to this court to be a fairly straightforward 
task on remand. 
Nevertheless, plaintiff sought summary judgment as to 
performance under Addendum 2. That was denied in a order dated 
July 8, 2003. 
-7-
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On January 20, 2004, the case was scheduled for trial for 
April 20, 2004. Motions were to be filed by February 9, 2004. 
On February 11, 2004, plaintiff filed a motion for summary 
judgment on Nagle's offset defense. 
After hearing on April 12, 2004, that was denied in an order 
dated April 26, 2004. Motions in limine were scheduled. 
Nagle filed a motion in limine in May, 2004, and plaintiff 
filed four motions in limine. On May 26, 2004, the court ruled 
those motions of plaintiff were actually motions that should be 
adjudicated under summary judgment standards, and those were set 
for argument. 
Those were further briefed and were argued. At a hearing on 
July 14, 2004, Nagle's motion to exclude Steven Earl from 
testifying was denied in an order of July 22, 2004. 
Plaintiffs motions were also heard and after intermediate 
motions for relief an order was issued October 14, 2004. 
Plaintiff's first motion in limine was denied (dealing with 
mutuality of obligations, and Nagle's standing), the third and 
fourth motions were denied (dealing with the sale of the 55,000 
shares and election of remedies by Nagle), and the second was 
granted (dealing with parol evidence being allowed concerning a 
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novation of Addendum 2). 
At a scheduling conference of February 25, 2005, a trial was 
set for June 7 and 8, 2005, after an earlier trial had been 
scheduled and postponed due to an illness in counsel's family. 
Thereafter, numerous motions in limine were again filed. 
In a ruling of April 25, 2005, the court ruled on those. 
Plaintiff on May 20, 2005, filed a document entitled 
"Plaintiff's Proposed Pretrial Order." It is a further memo of 
plaintiff, dealing with plaintiff's defenses to the offset 
remedy, those defenses including the need for defendant to remove 
the lis pendens, election of remedies, the merger doctrine, 
violation of covenants of title, and other legal doctrines. It 
purports to list 56 paragraphs of uncontested facts (pp. 33-47) 
and contested issues of fact and law. 
Nagle on May 31, 2005, filed a motion to strike plaintiff's 
pre trial order arguing it was merely another summary judgment 
motion. On that same date Nagle filed his own pre trial order. 
On that same date, May 31, 2005, plaintiff filed a motion to 
quash a subpoena issued to Kirk Blosch and requested an expedited 
determination. Defendant opposed that motion on June 3, 2005. 
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The court dealt with that motion at trial and did not quash the 
subpoena. 
: The court heard evidence, received exhibits, heard argument 
of counsel, took the matter under advisement, and is fully 
advised, and renders the following memorandum decision. 
The court finds as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On March 30, 1978, LeRoy Collard (Collard) purchased a 
condominium on Quail Hollow Drive from Nagle Construction using a 
Uniform Real Estate Contract together with Addendum 1. (Ex. 6). 
The price was to be $100,500, and Collard was to pay $10,000 as a 
down payment, assume the mortgage with First Security Bank in the 
sum of $59,958.75, and give 55,000 shares of stock in Utah Coal 
and Chemical Corp. to pay the balance of $30,541.26. Title was 
to be delivered to Collard when the marketability of the stock 
and its value were verified and there was not to be an 
unreasonable delay in so doing. 
2. Collard did not assume the mortgage because Collard had a 
previous bankruptcy and was unable to do so. Nagle considered 
this a breach and notified Collard orally, but not in writing, 
and Collard and Nagel Construction entered into Addendum 2. That 
-10-
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document (Ex. 6) is undated but was signed before September 18, 
1979. It provided that title under the contract would be 
transferred when Nagle Construction sold sufficient shares of the 
stock to realize $85,000 cash. Nagle Construction was to 
accomplish that sale within one year of receipt of the shares 
providing the value reached $85,000. If the value did not reach 
that amount within one year, Collard was to convey more shares or 
cash sufficient to bring the total value to $85,000 before Nagle 
Construction was to convey title. In other words, Addendum 2 
required basically an additional $55,000 from Collard in exchange 
for the forebearance of Nagel in not seeking foreclosure based on 
the failure of Collard to assume the mortgage. Addendum 2 did not 
provide any times in which any thing was to be done. The Uniform 
Contract, however, contained a standard "time is of the essence" 
provision. 
3. Collard paid the down payment and began making payments 
on the mortgage and took possession of the property immediately 
after the contract was signed. He also paid taxes and made 
improvements to the property over the years. Collard or his 
successors continued to retain possession, make improvements, pay 
taxes and make payments on the mortgage until January, 2001. 
4. On a date unknown, but in April, 1978, Gary Nagle 
(Nagle), as president of Nagle Construction, executed a warranty 
deed from Nagle Construction to Nagle, recorded April 12, 1978. 
-11-
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(Ex. 8). That was done without notice to Collard. On that same 
date a Deed of Trust was recorded with the Nagles as Trustors and 
First Security as Beneficiary. (Ex. 9). 
5. On May 18, 1978, Collard recorded a Notice of Contract, 
which Nagle, on behalf of Nagle Construction, signed. That simply 
indicated Collard claimed and asserted an interest under the 
contract in the property. (Ex. 12). 
6. On or about September 18, 1979, Collard delivered 105,000 
shares of stock in San Juan Mining, the predecessor of Utah Coal, 
to Nagle and a transfer agent, who registered the shares in 
Nagle's name that date. (Ex. 14). San Juan changed its name in 
1972 to St. Mary's Glacier and in 1977 to Utah Coal and later in 
1994 to Lifestream Technologies, but it remained the same 
corporation. (Ex. 1). 
The court finds that, the original 55,000 shares of Utah Coal 
were not delivered by Collard to Nagle Construction immediately 
after the contract was signed. The delivery occurred 
approximately eighteen months later, in September, 1979. 
If the case involves 55,000 shares the value of each share 
would have to reach $1.54 to achieve $85,000 if sold. If the 
number of shares involved is 105,000, the value of each share 
would have to reach $.81 to result in $85,000 upon sale, not 
considering any commissions or other fees. 
The court is fully aware that the Utah Court of Appeals 
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indicated that the task of this court on remand was to determine 
the value of the 55,000 shares. Addendum 1 talks of 55,000 
shares. However, the court, having heard the evidence and 
testimony and examined the exhibits and having thus considered 
more than the affidavits and records involved in the case at the 
summary judgment stage, finds as a fact contrary to the 
understanding previously that 55,000 shares was involved. The 
records clearly demonstrate that the 55,000 shares was the amount 
set forth in Addendum 1, and that Addendum 1 was referred to in 
Addendum 2. The court is finding, however, that it is clear to 
the court that Collard owed $85,000 to Nagle and that to pay that 
amount more than the 55,000 shares would be required given the 
historical value of the Utah Coal shares. 
The court finds that 105,000 shares were delivered by 
Collard to Nagle. That is contrary to Nagle's testimony that 
55,000 shares were received from Collard under the contract and 
that he, Nagle, purchased an additional 50,000 shares from 
Collard. The court bases this finding on the unlikelihood of 
that being true given all the history of the case and the records 
involved. Originally Nagle denied in his answer and answers to 
first set of interrogatories that he had received any stock at 
all from Collard. The exhibits admitted show that in fact Nagle 
received 105,000 shares of Utah Coal on September 19, 1979 from 
Collard. If Collard owed Nagle $85,000, it does not comport with 
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reason that Nagle would give Collard $10,000 in the form of a 
check for those shares as Nagle said. Rather it is reasonable 
that Collard would transfer the additional 50,000 shares to Nagle 
and Nagle would simply reduce the $85,000 owing to the amount 
remaining depending on the value of those 50,000 shares. Further, 
Nagle had no documents, even though his accountant and financial 
advisor did his books, that supported the claimed payment by 
Nagle to Collard of $10,000 in the September 1979 time frame. 
The court can understand and appreciate that events that long ago 
may fade in memory and many records may be destroyed or lost, but 
given all the circumstances of this transfer of Utah Coal shares, 
the court finds as above. Thus, for the 105,000 shares to 
realize $85,000 under the contract, the price of Utah Coal would 
have had to reach $.81 per share. That delivery of stock was 
intended to be in payment of the $85,000 owing by Collard to 
Nagle. 
7. Nagle did not sell the stock delivered at any time during 
the year after receipt. Nagle inquired as to the value of the 
stock through his accountant on one occasion. The only evidence 
was that the accountant asked an unnamed broker at a brokerage 
firm, Wilson-Davis, to sell the stock but it was not established 
at what price the sale was to be nor was it established in any 
way what occurred except that the stock was not sold. There was 
no testimony as to any other attempts to sell the stock. Nagle 
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did not place a "limit order" such that the stock would be sold 
when it reached a certain value. Nagle did not deliver the stock 
certificates to any broker, including Wilson-Davis, for sale. 
Without being a regular customer Wilson-Davis could not sell the 
shares without having possession of the stock certificates. In 
addition, Nagle purchased, independent of this transaction with 
Collard, an additional 60,000 shares in Utah Coal through a 
different brokerage firm in December, 1979. That indicates to 
the court that Nagle was not seeking to sell the stock but was 
seeking to acquire the stock, no doubt in the anticipation that 
the value of the stock would rise. 
8. Nagle during the year following the receipt of the 
105,000 shares did not ever tell Collard that the price did not 
yield $85,000 nor did Nagle ask for more shares or cash. Nagle 
and Collard did have several conversations about the transaction 
but Nagle never notified Collard in writing of any default until 
the letter of January 13, 1981. Nagle did not properly advise 
under the contract, or advise in any manner, the amount of 
"deficiency" Collard owed. That is, Nagel did not state that the 
stock was selling for "X" and so Collard owed "Y" amount to make 
up the difference between the value of the sale at "X" value and 
the $85,000. 
9. In a letter from Nagle Construction's lawyer on January 
13, 1981, (Ex. 17) Nagle Construction said Collard had breached 
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the agreement and threatened to file suit. Collard responded that 
indeed the value had reached $85,000. That letter of January 13, 
1981, again refers to the 55,000 shares and not 105,000 shares, 
but the court finds, as discussed above, that the sequence of 
events and the documents from neutral entities such as the 
transfer agent show that it was not 55,000 shares involved at the 
time of Addendum 2. 
10. Collard transferred his interest to plaintiff trust by 
warranty deed on January 3, 1997. Collard passed away February 
8, 1997. Plaintiff sold the property to a third party, a family 
member, for a price the court finds reasonable under the 
circumstances. There was an appraisal in 1999 for approximately 
$250,000 on the property. The sales price, without commission 
involved, was $230,000 approximately, and there was a lis pendens 
on the property which made it not feasible to resell the 
property, and it has been leased by the current owners. The court 
finds no inequitable conduct on behalf of plaintiff in the sale 
in the facts presented. 
11. After this complaint was filed Nagle Construction, 
through Nagel, executed an assignment of the contract which 
purported to, as of March 30, 1978, transfer all of the rights of 
Nagel Construction under the contract to Nagle, but none of the 
liabilities were assigned. (Ex. 10). 
12. The parties introduced conflicting evidence as to the 
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value of the Utah Coal stock in the relevant time period-
September 18, 1979, through September 18, 1980. (See exhibits 
34-37, 102). Plaintiff's evidence showed the value of the stock, 
during at least eleven weeks, was sufficient, if sold, to realize 
$85,000. Defendant's evidence showed the value was never 
sufficient such that if sold the stock would realize $85,000. 
The court paid close attention to the two competing experts 
t 
and has examined their documents carefully. The court was not 
satisfied that either party proved, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, the value of the Utah Coal stock within the relevant 
time. 
The court was not satisfied that plaintiff, through its 
expert, showed the value of the stock at any given time in the 
relevant year was any value that can be stated with certainty. 
However, the court is more satisfied from defendant's expert that 
the value of the stock, 105,000 shares of Utah Coal, was at or 
near a certain value at various times in the relevant year. Of 
course that was not the intent of the parties in calling those 
witnesses but the court finds and concludes as follows. Still, 
the court has not been convinced by either party by a 
preponderance of the evidence as to what the value was at any 
given time. 
Plaintiff's expert provided documents that he said were 
national averages, yet the court was not and is not satisfied 
-17-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
that the underlying data is reliable or believable. Even the 
witness stated he did not verify the underlying data. Moreover, 
the court simply is not clear, under a preponderance of the 
evidence standard, just how the figures used by plaintiff's 
expert as set forth in Exhibit 2 were arrived at or can be relied 
upon. If the figures are national averages the court does not 
understand how those were arrived at by whomever compiled the 
information. The court admitted the exhibit as an exception to 
the hearsay rule under URE, 803(17), but that does not compel the 
conclusion that the court must rely on the information. If Utah 
Coal was a Utah corporation, or a Nevada corporation, it seems 
unlikely that there would be much trading in the stock in, for 
example, Charleston, South Carolina or Mobile, Alabama. It was 
not explained by the witness how the "averages" were arrived at, 
what volume of stock sale was involved, how many different 
entities contributed to the data used in compiling the averages, 
or why the sales price would be where the exhibit suggested it 
was in comparison to actual sales that occurred in Utah in the 
same time frame. Those Utah sales were much, much lower than the 
national "averages" and for those reasons the court finds the 
testimony of plaintiff's expert was not such that it convinced 
the court that exhibit 2 established any legitimate values at any 
particular time. 
On the other hand, defendant's expert's testimony, on both 
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direct and cross examination, as well as the exhibits produced, 
present to the court a much more believable and understandable 
and reasonable series of facts relating to the value of the 
stock. The data used by the defendant's experts, in exhibits 102 
and 34-37 as provided by plaintiff, reflect actual Utah sales and 
the volume of stock sold and whether it was bought or sold. 
The court still cannot, however, conclude that the value of 
the stock achieved or did not achieve the value of $.81 for a 
variety of reasons. Defendant's expert validated exhibits 
produced and obtained, in fact, by plaintiff, from business 
records of the employer of defendant's expert. (Exs. 34-37). 
Those showed that at various time in the relevant year, the stock 
sold on almost all occasions at less than $.81, but on two 
occasions, September 19 and 20, 1979, it sold for $.83, those 
each involving 1000 shares. Those exhibits were less than fully 
persuasive also because they covered only the last quarter of 
1979. Those records did not reflect trading in 1980, the bulk of 
the time. Exhibit 102, produced by defendant, is less credible 
overall than exhibits 34-37, produced by plaintiff, in that 
Exhibit 102 was a randomly selected series of transactions meant 
to be illustrative of the value in a given month, yet it was 
clear that there were several transactions reflected in exhibits 
34-39 that were not utilized by defendant's expert that in fact 
show the value of the stock was higher than represented by 
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exhibit 102. The court does not comment on nor find the expert 
of defendant did any such calculations for improper purposes, but 
it is factually clear that there were transactions involving a 
higher value that he did not use to illustrate the value in 
exhibit 102. As noted, the records of Wilson-Davis which were 
produced were only for 1979. At least exhibit 102 had the 
benefit of having some information for 1980 and those entries, as 
described, show the stock was trading higher in early 1980 than 
it was later in the year. 
Moreover, and the court does not attach great weight to this 
fact, plaintiff in its response (Ex. 7) in a letter of January 
23, 1981, relied on the Wilson-Davis records in its effort to 
convince defendant that the value of the stock was at a certain 
level. 
Moreover, even if the two instances where the stock traded 
at $.83 are fully considered, they involved 1000 shares each. 
This stock involved, even if it was considered to be 55,000 
shares, involved a substantially larger volume and number of 
shares. While there are many exceptions to a general rule 
explained by the testimony that larger amounts of shares usually 
sell for less than smaller numbers, that number of shares would 
not necessarily command or yield the same price as much smaller 
transactions. Further, commissions were not considered and even 
at a value of $.83, on that number of shares, the court does not 
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believe if sold at $.83, 105,000 shares would yield the cash 
equivalent of $85,000 to Nagle. 
Thus, the court finds that the value of the stock did not 
achieve $.81 in the time frame to be considered by the court on 
remand from the Court of Appeals. There is simply insufficient 
evidence. 
The court does not fault either party for the paucity of 
evidence but the problems reflects the difficulty, frankly, of 
the court's task on remand. The Court of Appeals evidently 
envisioned a rather mathematical calculation as to the value of 
the shares of stock, and if it was worth $85,000 Collard fully 
performed under the contract and if the value did not, the value 
was readily calculable and Nagle was entitled to an offset of the 
difference between $85,000 and that readily calculable amount. 
Unfortunately, the value of the stock is not in fact, and the 
court finds it to be a fact and a conclusion of law, readily 
ascertainable or calculable. 
Stock prices, as is common knowledge and as is revealed by 
the testimony and exhibits in this case, fluctuate seemingly with 
the wind, based on factors that probably occupy many minds who 
attempt to figure out such problems. The court simply is able to 
do the best it can in finding a "value" of the stock. The 
contract, Addendum 2, provided that defendant could sell the 
stock whenever it reached a certain value. There were times when 
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it did in some fashion. The court's task is frankly made 
impossible because the stock, like all stocks, traded in value at 
different times for different prices. The records, if fully 
relied on and believed, show on one day a certain volume of 
shares sold for as little as $.16. (Ex. 102, Aug. 28, 1980). 
Even the actual transactions, if believed fully, show that on 
September 17, 1979 (a date irrelevant to the court's task of 
finding the value, but illustrative of the problem) shares sold 
for as much as $1.22 and ON THE VERY NEXT DAY, September 18, 
1979, sold for $.77. Just exactly how this court is to "find" a 
"true" value at some point in the year so that the court can 
calculate an offset is a task seemingly unguided. 
The court concludes, after examining all the exhibits of 
both experts, and considering the testimony, that during the 
relevant year the stock could have been sold for an average price 
of $.50. That is based on the exhibits which show that just 
before September 18, 1979, the stock traded in some transactions 
at approximately $1.20, and at various times during the relevant 
year traded in the $.50 to $.75 range, and on two occasions at 
$.83 as mentioned. The price of stock obviously fluctuates and 
changes and is dependent on many variables. The evidence simply 
did not lend itself to an exact calculation, given that the range 
of prices were almost all for substantially smaller numbers of 
shares of stock. The larger volume sales were in the range of 
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price at about $.25. Given this number of shares, and all the 
evidence, the court has done the best it can to determine the 
value of the stock for purposes of this case. 
13. On November 24, 2001, Nagle caused a lis pendens to be 
recorded against the property. (Ex. 20). 
14. Based on the order of the court Nagle and Nagle 
Construction executed a special warranty deed conveying the 
property to plaintiff on November 21, 2000. That was recorded 
January 5, 2001. (Ex. 20). 
Based on the above findings and discussion, the court makes 
the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiff did not fulfill the conditions of the contract 
which called for him to provide, in shares of Utah Coal, the 
equivalent of $85,000 cash before he was entitled to title. 
2. The Utah Court of Appeals fashioned an equitable remedy 
and remanded the matter to this court to basically find the value 
of the stock and further fashion an equitable remedy in the form 
of offset or recoupment if the court found Collard had not fully 
performed by tendering the requisite value of stock. 
3. Given that plaintiff fulfilled the other conditions of 
the contract, by paying the down payment and mortgage payments 
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and improvements, and by continuously inhabiting the property, 
the court concludes it would not be equitable to allow defendant 
to regain title to the property. The Court of Appeals indicated 
it would not be equitable to allow plaintiff to have title if he 
did not fulfill the conditions of the contract. It would also 
not be equitable at this point to allow defendant to obtain 
title. The property has been sold and is in the hands of third 
parties, though a family member of Collard. Plaintiff had a good 
faith belief in the value of the stock he tendered, as indicated 
by the historical trading values which showed that before the 
relevant year the stock traded at over $1.00 on several 
occasions. Thus, plaintiff's failures were in degree rather than 
a failure to perform or partially perform. Offset is a 
particularly proper remedy in this case because of factors 
obvious from the findings of fact. Defendant clearly could have, 
at varying points throughout the year, sold the stock for at 
least something. It could have often been sold for very near, in 
all likelihood, the value needed to achieve $85,000. Had this 
contract simply called for the payment of money, plaintiff would 
have defaulted and the partial performance would not likely 
salvage this remedy for plaintiff. Here, the contract called for 
the delivery of stock. The records from the past illustrate that 
Collard had at the very least a good faith belief that the stock 
was worth at least $95,000 as its traded value had often been 
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over $1.00. For defendant to do nothing as far as selling the 
stock, or even a portion of it during the relevant year, and then 
claim, in essence, that no payment had been made is not 
equitable. Had defendant sold the stock at SOME value, the 
amount owing by Collard would have been reduced. Defendant 
clearly, by inference from the fact that he purchased 60,000 more 
shares independent of this transaction, hoped for and anticipated 
an increase in value of the stock of Utah Coal. Evidently that 
did not happen and the stock value declined. Such is the market 
evidently. Still, given those factors, that defendant was 
"speculating" in the stock value, and did nothing to attempt to 
sell even a portion of the stock when it would have realized some 
value had he done so, does not entitle him to a forfeiture and 
possession of the property, but does entitle him to a fair 
offset. That is what the court has attempted to do. 
4. The difference in the value of the stock as found by the 
court and the amount due under the contract is $32,550. ($.81 X 
105,000=$85,050 minus $52,500,000[$.50 X 105,000]). Thus, the 
amount of "failing" of plaintiff was approximately one fifth of 
the purchase price ($150,000). These events were over 25 years 
ago. Neither party treated the matter properly in the late 1970s 
or early 1980s. The court, in fashioning an equitable remedy, 
believes that offset is proper as indicated by the Court of 
Appeals, and that the amount of offset to which Nagle is entitled 
r 
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is $32,550, being the difference in the value of the stock as 
found by the court and the difference in what would be needed to 
completely fulfill the contract. Recoupment and reconveyance of 
title would not be equitable given all the circumstances, as 
mentioned above. Further, as noted by this court in its November 
6, 2000, order (now overruled) forfeiture was waived. Offset is 
the proper remedy under these facts. 
5. Plaintiff raised several legal defenses and arguments in 
the motion for directed verdict at the end of its case and at the 
end of the case which it says defeats an offset claim. All 
motions are denied, including the motion of defendant for 
directed verdict. The court believes that with the exception of 
the claim of the merger doctrine and laches, the defenses have 
been rejected previously and are the law of the case. 
6. As to plaintiff's claim that defendant elected remedies 
the court believes that the issue was raised in plaintiff's 
motion in limine, treated by the court as a summary judgment 
motion, and was determined against plaintiff on October 14, 2004. 
That is the law of the case on this issue and precludes the court 
from reconsidering it. 
7. Plaintiff's claim, that the Nagles lack standing and that 
there is not mutuality of obligation is rejected. The court also 
believes that has been dealt with in the order of October 14, 
2004, and is the law of the case on this issue. Associated with 
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that argument is the argument that the warranty deed from Nagle 
Construction to Nagle is invalid because Nagle Construction had 
already sold the property and equitable conversion applies. If 
Nagle had the ability and sufficient ownership to convey by 
special warranty deed this property to plaintiff under court 
order, which deed is relied on by plaintiff to legitimize the 
sale to a third party, then Nagle has sufficient ability to seek 
its return. 
8. As to the claim that Nagle Construction is dissolved and 
thus could did not assert a counterclaim the court believes that 
a dissolved corporation may defend itself and do any act needed 
to wind up its affairs, even after a passage of time of this 
length. Plaintiff sued Nagle Construction, and it did not file a 
counterclaim but the Court of Appeals has allowed an offset if 
certain facts are found by the trial court. The court believes 
the law allows that to occur even though Nagle Construction is 
dissolved. 
9. As to plaintiff's argument that offset is precluded 
because of the "merger" doctrine and that this offset claim is in 
violation of the statutory covenants of the special warranty 
deed, that issue was not considered previously nor was it 
considered by the court of appeals. The court believes that the 
merger doctrine does not apply in this case because the special 
warranty deed was executed by Nagel pursuant to an order of this 
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court. Granted, the defendant did not stay the order effectively. 
However, the Court of Appeals reversed the grant of summary 
judgment, and thus the order of specific performance which was 
the basis for the special warranty deed. Thus, the order of the 
court requiring the execution and delivery and recording of the 
special warranty deed is not effective, and the special warranty 
deed is not effective. The doctrine does not apply under these 
facts. 
10. Plaintiff's claim that there was a condition precedent 
unfulfilled by Nagle which excuses Collard from performance is 
rejected. There is no such language in the addenda or the 
contract. 
11. Plaintiff claims that defendant did not mitigate his 
damages in that he did not attempt to sell the stock and seek the 
difference. The court agrees that the value of the stock, and 
what it "truly" was at any given time was not proven by either 
party by a preponderance of the evidence. However, and even 
though the court has commented upon the failure of defendant to 
attempt to sell the stock at some price, it is plaintiff's 
obligation under the remand order to prove the value of the stock 
reached $85,000, and the court has found and concluded plaintiff 
did not prove that value and so there was a failure of a 
condition of the contract. 
In equity, the court is granting specific performance as did 
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the court on summary judgment and as was approved, if the 
conditions were fulfilled by Collard, by the Utah Court of 
Appeals. Defendant came closer to proving the value of the stock 
than did plaintiff. Given the uncertainty as to value, the court 
is crafting this equitable remedy which it thinks does justice to 
both sides in this rather ancient dispute. Specific performance 
was declared by the Utah Court of appeals to be a proper remedy 
in this case, but not on summary judgment where there was a 
dispute over certain facts. 
12. Plaintiff claims laches precludes the offset. The Court 
of Appeals indicated in the remand order that whether laches 
precludes recovery turns on disputed issues of fact and so it was 
not a proper consideration under summary judgment standards. 
Plaintiff claims that laches, waiver, or equitable estoppel 
defeat this claim because Nagle never asserted the claim for 
breach despite the January 13, 1981, letter. Witness memories 
have faded, documents have been lost or destroyed, and key 
witnesses (Collard, and Eldredge, the transfer agent) have died. 
For laches to succeed, there must be a lack of diligence on the 
part of a party and an injury to the other party owing to that 
lack of diligence. Again, this is an equitable doctrine. 
Plaintiff also waited until 1999 to file suit, and as the Court 
of Appeals stated, Collard sat on his rights as did defendant. 
The loss of documents and memory has affected more than one 
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party. The records form the greater part of this case, rather 
than live testimony. While certainly Collard could have 
benefitted from being able to counter some of the testimony of 
Nagle, the court has not greatly credited Nagle in his key 
testimony. The court does not believe that plaintiff has 
suffered injury due to a lack of action by defendant and laches 
does not preclude this offset remedy. The court has relied 
principally on records in reaching its findings and conclusions 
and the court sees no prejudice to plaintiff. Under all of the 
facts as are present in this case laches is not applicable as a 
defense. 
13. As to defendant's request for prejudgment interest, that 
is not proper in this case. For prejudgment interest to be 
applicable, the damages must be complete and be measurable by 
fixed rules of evidence and known standards of value. Here, the 
amount of any offset was not determinable until facts were 
presented, and then the amount is set only as an equitable remedy 
after the facts were known. The amount was not set as of a 
particular time and the damage remedy has been determined by a 
fact finder. No prejudgment interest is awarded. 
14. Plaintiff is entitled to the specific performance that 
has occurred and to any documents that are needed to effectuate 
this order. Because plaintiff did not fulfill completely the 
conditions of the contract, defendant is entitled to an offset in 
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the sum set forth above and judgment is granted to defendant in 
that amount. 
15. The lis pendens should be removed immediately. 
Plaintiff has suffered no damages proven from the lodging of that 
lis pendens. No evidence was presented on that issue. Plaintiff 
withdrew a previously filed petition to nullify the lien. Any 
damages have been waived if there were any. Title was in 
plaintiff, now a third party, and the lis pendens is ordered 
removed. 
16. Defendant sought a reconveyance of the title and 
forfeiture and possession of the property. Accordingly, the 
court does not believe that defendant has fully prevailed in this 
action. Defendant's claims are in equity and defendant did not 
prevail on any legal claim asserted in a counterclaim, he did not 
prevail under the contract. The Court of Appeals on remand made 
clear that the trial court was to determine whether and to whom 
attorney fees and costs should be awarded, as the parties 
intended the defaulting party should be responsible for attorney 
fees. The contract allows fees incurred in obtaining possession 
or in pursuing a remedy under the contract or in enforcing the 
contract. Possession was not obtained by defendant and a remedy 
and enforcement was not under the contract, but a remedy in 
equity was granted. 
Because the default was plaintiff's, but an equitable remedy 
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only is fashioned, and neither defendant nor plaintiff has fully 
and substantially prevailed, neither party is entitled to 
attorney fees. 
Defendant is to prepare an order in compliance with URCP, 
Rule 7(f) setting forth this ruling. 
DATE D this !(} day of / 
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THOMPSON E. FEHR 
January 13, 1981 
Mr. LeRoy Collard 
3842 Quail Hollow Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84119 
Re: Uniform Real Estate Contract dated March 30, 1978 
Dear Mr. Collard: 
This office represents Nagle Construction Company, Inc. 
We have been requested by Nagle Construction to contact 
you concerning that certain Uniform Real Estate Contract 
made March- 30, 1978 by and between Nagle Construction Com-
pany, Inc. as seller and you as buyer. 
In connection with the above-referenced Contract, you 
are reminded that pursuant to Addendum #2 thereof, Nagle 
Construction Company, Inc. was to sell 55,000 shares of 
capital stock in Utah Coal and Chemical Corporation which 
had been tendered by you as part of the down payment for 
the property which is the subject of the Contract. The 
sale of the stock was to occur any time during the period 
specified in the Addendum at which Nagle Construction could 
realize the sum of $85,000. You are further reminded that 
in keeping with the terms of Addendum. #2, Nagle Construction 
Company, Inc. informed you within the period specified in 
the Addendum of. its intention to sell the stock. Upon 
being so informed, you represented and agreed to purchase 
from Nagle Construction the 55,000 shares of stock for the 
sum of $8 5,000. In reliance thereon, Nagle Construction 
withheld sale of the stock on the open market pending tender 
by you of said sum. Thereafter, the value of the stock de-
clined, making it impossible for Nagle Construction to 
realize the requisite sum from a sale of the stock on the 
open market. Your offer to purchase the stock and Nagle 
Construction's detrimental reliance thereon constitutes a 
novation of the Uniform Real Estate Contract to the extent 
that your representations and Nagle Construction's reliance 
modified its terms. / ^ it±r\ 
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January 13, 1981 
Mr. LeRoy Collard 
384 2 Quail Hollow Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84119 
Re: Uniform Real Estate Contract dated March 30, 1978 
Dear Mr. Collard: 
This office represents Nagle Construction Company, Inc. 
We have been requested by Nagle Construction to contact 
you concerning that certain Uniform Real Estate Contract 
made March 30, 1978 by and between Nagle Construction Com-
pany, Inc. as seller and you as buyer. 
A 
In connect ion with the above-referenced Cont rac t , you 
are reminded t h a t pursuant to Addendum #2 the reof , Nagle 
Construction Company, Inc . was to s e l l 55,000 shares of 
cap i t a l s tock in Utah Coal and Chemical Corporat ion which 
had been t endered by you as par t of the down payment for 
the proper ty which i s the subject of the Con t r ac t . The 
sale of t he s tock was to occur any time dur ing the period 
specif ied in the Addendum at which Nagle Const ruct ion could 
rea l i ze the sum of $85,000. You are f u r t h e r reminded tha t 
in keeping with the terms of Addendum #2, Nagle Construction 
Company, I n c . informed you within the per iod speci f ied in 
the Addendum of. i t s in ten t ion to s e l l t he s t ock . Upon 
being so informed, you represented and agreed to purchase 
from Nagle Const ruct ion the 55,000 shares of stock for the 
sum of $85,000. In r e l i ance thereon, Nagle Construction 
withheld s a l e of the stock on the open market pending tender 
by you of s a id sum. Thereafter , the value of the stock de-
cl ined, making i t impossible for Nagle Cons t ruc t ion to 
rea l ize the r e q u i s i t e sum from a sa l e of t he stock on the 
open market. Your offer to purchase the s tock and Nagle 
Cons t ruc t ion ' s de t r imenta l r e l i ance thereon c o n s t i t u t e s a 
novation of t he Uniform Real Es ta te Cont rac t to the extent 
that your r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s and Nagle C o n s t r u c t i o n ' s re l iance 
modified i t s t e rms . 
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Contrary to your agreement to do so, you have failed to 
deliver to Nagle Construction the sum of $85,000. As a 
direct and foreseeable consequence thereof Nagle Construction 
has failed to realize the sum of $85,000 from the sale of the 
stock as contemplated by the provisions of Addendum #2 to 
the Contract and the subsequent novation thereof. 
Demand is herewith made upon you to deliver to Nagle 
Construction Company, Inc. either the sum of $8 5,000 or a 
sufficient number of shares of stock in Utah Coal and Chem-
ical Corporation which when combined with the 55,000 shares 
currently held by Nagle Construction will equal a current 
market value of $85,000. 
Delivery of either the aforesaid sum or the stock to 
Nagle Construction Company, Inc. or to the undersigned at 
the address listed above must be accomplished on or before 
January 25, 1981. You are advised that your failure to 
tender the sums or the stock as required in Addendum #2 to 
the Contract and its subsequent novation will be deemed by 
Nagle Construction to be a breach of the Contract and a 
default thereunder and will result in the institution of 
legal proceedings against you for foreclosure of the Con-
tract as a note and mortgage. 
Yours truly, 
JENSEN & LLOY# 
(j{j. 1/jJSifikd 
W. Waldan L l o y d ' 
WWL/ds 
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COLLARD. KUHNHAUSEN. PlXTON & DOWNES 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
417 CHURCH STREET 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84111 
TELEPHONE 8 0 1 • 5 3 4 - 1 6 6 3 
January 22, 1981 
Mr. W. Waldan Lloyd 
Jensen & Lloyd 
870 Comerical S e c u r i t y Bank Tower 
50 South Main S t r e e t 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84144 
RE: Roy Col la rd /Uniform Real E s t a t e C o n t r a c t da ted 
March 30 , 1978 
Dear Mr. Lloyd: 
I am writing in response to your letter to 
my father, Roy Collard, dated January 13, 1981. 
Let me begin by saying that my father has 
had business dealings with Gary Nagle and Nagle Con-
struction Co. for several years. During that time, 
he has considered Mr. Nagle to be a personal friend 
as well as a business associate. He has certainly 
endeavored to treat Mr. Nagle fairly and feels badly 
that Mr. Nagle does not feel that he has received 
fair treatment in this instance. 
In your letter, you assert that the 55,000 
shares of Utah Coal and Chemicals stock declined 
in value and could not be sold for the $85,000.00 
referred to in the contract. However, in checking 
the summary sheets of stock sale quotations compiled 
by Prince-Covey, I find that there are numerous days 
on which the stock could have been sold and the 
$85,000.00 realized. I have enclosed copies of the 
sheets for your information. I have also inquire^ 
at Wilson-Davis and asked them to prepare similar! 
summaries to further document the sale price of the 
stock. 
Certainly, after Mr. Nagle received the Utah 
Coal and Chemicals stock, my father had no control 
over the sale of the stock and could not force itfe 
KATKBYN COLLAR© 
STEVEN KUHNHAUSEN 
SUZAN FDCTON 
W'XULiAM W. DOWNES. JR . 
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sale. Like any investor, Mr. Nagle had the opportunity 
to sell or hold the stock as he chose according to 
his judgment of the market. The fact that he failed 
to sell the stock on those occasions when he could 
have realized the sum set forth in the contract is 
in no sense attributable to any action on the part 
of my father. 
I sincerely hope that in light of the foregoing, 
your client will choose not to initiate legal pro-
ceedings. Based upon my evaluation of the facts 
of this case, the action you propose would be ground-
less and would only result in further expense and 
inconvenience to both parties. 
I appreciate your attention to this matter. 
KC/ts 
c.c.: Roy Collard 
4 
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